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THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978-A
REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Glenn E. Pasvogel, Jr.*
Introduction
October 1, 1979 marked the beginning of a new era in the
American law of bankruptcy. It was on that day that the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 was superceded by the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978. The culmination of over eight years of legislative study,
debate, and compromise, the 1978 Act was the first major revision
of American bankruptcy law in over 40 years. Substantively, the
new Bankruptcy Act modernizes bankruptcy law to cope with the
ever-increasing bankruptcy caseload, the expansion of the con-
sumer and commercial credit industry, and changes in related sub-
stantive law, such as the near-universal adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Additionally, the Act makes important struc-
tural changes in the bankruptcy court system by increasing the
jurisdiction, authority, and status of bankruptcy courts. This arti-
cle represents a summary of those substantive and structural pro-
visions generally applicable to bankruptcy administration and spe-
cifically applicable to bankruptcy liquidation. A future article will
treat those substantive changes applicable only to debtor rehabili-
tation and reorganization.
Legislative History
In July, 1968, the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on the status and ade-
quacy of bankruptcy law and administration in the United States.1
Similar hearings were conducted by Subcommittee No. 4 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary in October of the following
year.2 The hearings uncovered numerous problems with the then
* B.A., Elmhurst College; J.D., DePaul University; Professor of Law, University of Ar-
kansas at Little Rock School of Law.
1. Hearings on Senate Joint Resolution 100 Before The Subcomm. on Bankruptcy of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
2. Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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existent bankruptcy system. The rising tide of consumer bankrupt-
cies, a system of administration that was costly, inefficient, and un-
necessarily time-consuming, a lack of adequate protection of the
debtor's discharge, and a lack of uniformity in treatment of debt-
ors and creditors among the various judicial districts all pointed
toward a need for substantial revision of the bankruptcy laws.3 As
a result of these hearings, Public Law 91-354 created the Commis-
sion on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States with the charge
to "study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend changes" in the
Bankruptcy Act.4
The Commission, consisting of nine members and a staff of
twenty-seven, conducted its investigation over a period of more
than two years and issued its final report on July 30, 1973." The
report was in two parts. Part I contained the Commission's find-
ings concerning the status and administration of bankruptcy law
and its recommendations for legislative change. Part II consisted of
a draft bill (with a comprehensive commentary and explanation)
designed to implement those changes. The major recommendations
of the Commission may be summarized as follows:6
(1) Sever the administrative responsibilities from the judicial
functions of the bankruptcy judge so as to preserve actual as
well as apparent impartiality among the participants in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding.
3. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, 2-5 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION
REPORT]. During the period between 1946 and 1967, the number of cases commenced under
the Bankruptcy Act rose from 10,196 to 208,329. During the same period of time, the num-
ber of referees increased from approximately 50 full-time and 100 part-time to 174 and 40
respectively. The average caseload of a referee increased from approximately 132 to 1,074
cases. Id. at 2.
4. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
5. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3.
6. Id. at 5-31.
7. The Commission found no justification at all for bankruptcy judges to be involved
in the administrative paper shuffling which formed the largest part of bankruptcy adminis-
tration. Where litigation did arise, the Commission felt it to be particularly important that
the judge not have had prior administrative contact with the case:
The Commission is convinced that referees' participation in administrative as-
pects of bankruptcy proceedings tends to impair the litigants' confidence in the
impartiality of the tribunal's decision. In particular, adversaries of the trustee in
bankruptcy tend to doubt that the referee who appointed the trustee can insulate
himself from at least a suspicion of partiality when he may have previously been
involved in any or all of the following actions regarding the same estate: determin-
ing that the debtor had committed an act of bankruptcy; the appointment, or
[Vol. 3:13
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(2) Expand the jurisdiction and powers of the bankruptcy
court to alleviate inefficiency and delay caused a) by needless
overlap in jurisdiction between the bankruptcy court, the fed-
eral district court, and the various state courts, and b) by cur-
rent statutory requirements that the trustee litigate many ad-
verse claims to estate property in nonbankruptcy forums.a
(3) Create an administrative agency to handle cases involving
no litigation and to assume all administrative duties in cases
where litigation does arise.
(4) Provide increased relief for consumer debtors through
waiver of the filing fee for indigent debtors,9 making debt coun-
seling available to debtors with regular income, creation of a
uniform set of federal exemptions, abolition of reaffirmation as
a means of enforcing discharged debts,'0 modification of the
six-year bar on a subsequent bankruptcy discharge, and sub-
stantial modification of Chapter XIII to expand debtor eligibil-
ity, permit confirmation of a plan without creditor consent, and
permit a plan to provide for cure of default and payment of
secured debt over a reasonable period of time.
(5) Make it easier for creditors of business debtors to force
involuntary liquidation before dissipation of assets. This should
be done by abolishing the "act of bankruptcy" as a jurisdic-
tional requisite and substituting either an insolvency standard
approval of the election, of the trustee; the scrutiny of the petition, schedules,
statement of affairs, and other papers filed in the case; the conduct of the first
meeting of creditors and other meetings at which examination of the debtor and
other witnesses took place; and conferences with the trustee regarding collection
of the assets of the estate and litigation on its behalf.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3.
8. Section 23b. of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act required the trustee to litigate such claims
in nonbankruptcy courts unless the adverse party consented to the bankruptcy court's sum-
mary jurisdiction. For an analysis of § 23b. as it affected the availability of summary juris-
diction in the bankruptcy court, see generally MAcLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
BANKRUPTCY §§ 193-197 at 203-14 (1956) and 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 443 (14th ed. 1943).
9. In United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), the United States Supreme Court
held that it was not a violation of the fifth amendment due process clause for Congress to
deny a debtor a discharge for failure to pay the filing fee.
10. The Commission felt that the failure of the Bankruptcy Act to deal effectively
with reaffirmation frustrated the policy of providing the debtor with a "fresh start." Credi-
tors often made reaffirmation of discharged debts a condition of extending postbankruptcy
credit, leaving debtors with something of a Hobson's choice. Additionally, creditors were
using bad faith threats of litigation to determine the nondischargeability of debts associated
with false financial statements as leverage to obtain reaffirmation. The Commission recom-
mended the abolition of reaffirmation of unsecured debts as the only effective means of
guaranteeing a fresh start. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 10-11, and 177.
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of inability to pay debts or the suffering of a general assign-
ment or receivership without regard to solvency.1
(6) Allow a bankruptcy administrator to take possession of a
debtor's business between the time an involuntary petition is
filed and a subsequent adjudication to better preserve assets
from depletion.
(7) Comprehensively define "estate property" and provide for
less cumbersome liquidation.
(8) Abolish the Moore v. Bay1 2 doctrine so that the trustee
would only be subrogated to the actual avoidance rights of any
creditor as to whom a transfer of the debtor was voidable under
federal or state law.
(9) Make it easier for a trustee to avoid preferential transfers
by creating a presumption of insolvency during the applicable
period before bankruptcy (reduced from four months to three
months) and removing any requirement that the preferred
transferee have had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was
insolvent at the time of transfer. 3
11. The Commission found little support for the necessity of proving an "act of bank-
ruptcy" as a prerequisite to subjecting a debtor's assets to payment of creditor's claims. The
necessity and difficulty of proving a balance-sheet type of insolvency in conjunction with
most of the acts and the right to trial by jury that § 19a. gave every debtor on the issues of
insolvency and the commission of the act had the effect of delaying "liquidation until assets
(were] largely depleted" and was "a major factor in explaining the smallness of distributions
in business bankruptcies." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 14.
12. 284 U.S. 4 (1931). Moore v. Bay was a case construing the applicability of § 70c. of
Bankruptcy Act which gave the trustee the avoidance rights of any creditor as to whom a
transfer of the debtor was voidable. In Moore, the holder of a chattel mortgage executed by
the debtor delayed filing. Under applicable state law, the mortgage was void as against cred-
itors existing at the time the mortgage was entered into and those arising during the gap
between execution of the mortgage and filing. The value of the collateral was greater than
the amount of claims held by preexisting and gap creditors. The Court, in an opinion by
Justice Holmes (who was over 90 at the time), held that the mortgage was void in toto as
against the trustee, and the proceeds of liquidation were available for distribution among all
creditors. Id. at 4-5. Thus, the existence of one inconsequential creditor as to whom a trans-
fer of the debtor was voidable gave the trustee total avoidance power and provided all other
creditors with an advantage they would not otherwise have had. The Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States termed this "unfair and unjustified" and called for
abolition of the rule. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 18.
13. Bankruptcy law accords the trustee the power to avoid certain pre-petition trans-
fers for antecedent debt in order to "achieve a fair and equitable distribution among credi-
tors" and discourage "a scramble among the most diligent creditors, those with inside infor-
mation, and those with the greatest leverage over the debtor to obtain payment immediately
before an impending bankruptcy, which would frequently leave nothing for the less favored
creditors." COMMISSON REPORT, supra note 3, at 19. The Commission felt that these goals
were being frustrated under § 60a. of the Bankruptcy Act by requirements that 1) the trus-
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(10) Remove certain classes of transfers from the definition of
a preference where such transfers are in the ordinary course of
business, do not result from creditor advantage or leverage, and
the sanctioning of which would not encourage the dismember-
ing of a financially troubled debtor and thus precipitate
bankruptcy.
(11) Simplify and make distribution of the estate more equi-
table by abolishing the concept of provability and making vir-
tually all debts enforceable against the debtor allowable, invali-
dating most statutory liens as being merely disguised priorities,
and reducing the number of priority general claims to those for
administrative expenses, wages (increased to $1200 per em-
ployee), and taxes arising within one year prior to bankruptcy.
(12) Revise and consolidate into one chapter the three busi-
ness reorganization chapters (X, XI, and XII).
The Commission's draft bill was introduced in the 93d Con-
gress as H.R. 10792.4 An alternative bill, tracking the Commis-
son's bill in many respects but differing significantly in others, was
drafted by the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges and also
submitted to the 93d Congress as H.R. 16643.15 Both bills were re-
introduced in the 94th Congress as H.R. 31 and H.R. 3216 respec-
tively and were the subject of comprehensive hearings.1 7 Thirty-
five days of hearings produced over 2700 pages of testimony from
more than 100 witnesses.18 After the hearings, H.R. 31 and H.R. 32
were redrafted and consolidated into a single bill which was intro-
duced into the 95th Congress as H.R. 6.19
H.R. 6 was sent to the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary. Over 100
tee prove the debtor's insolvency on the day of transfer (usually impossible due to absence
of relevant records) and 2) the trustee prove that the transferee had reasonable cause to
believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of transfer. The Commission felt that the first
requirement was sound, but recommended that the transferee have the burden of proof. The
second requirement was believed irrelevant; thus its abolition was recommended. Id.
14. 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
15. 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
16. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
17. Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 27 (1975-
76).
18. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY].
19. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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amendments were adopted by the Subcommittee and numerous
other technical and stylistic changes were made. The amended bill
was introduced as H.R. 8200 on July 11, 1977.20 H.R. 8200 was
passed by the House on February 1, 1978,21 and sent to the Senate.
Last minute compromise resulted in H.R. 8200 as amended which
was passed by both House and Senate and signed by President
Carter as Public Law 95-598 on November 6, 1978.22
Structure of the Code
Public Law 95-598 is divided into four titles. Title I contains
the substantive law of bankruptcy liquidation and reorganization
which was codified as Title 11 of the United States Code. Title II
contains a series of amendments to Title 28 of the United States
Code. The amendments create the new United States Bankruptcy
Court and define its powers and jurisdiction, provide for the ap-
pointment, tenure, and salary of bankruptcy judges, and establish
the office of United States trustee on a five-year experimental basis
in selected judicial districts. Title III amends various federal stat-
utes which refer to bankruptcy law as to make them correspond to
changes brought about by Public Law 95-598. Finally, Title IV re-
peals old bankruptcy law and provides that certain provisions of
Public Law 95-598 not take effect immediately, but have delayed
applicability over a five-year transition period.
Title I, hereinafter referred to as the "Bankruptcy Code," con-
tains the substantive law of bankruptcy 2 and is divided into eight
20. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 18, at 3.
21. S. RaP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [19781 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 5787, 5788.
22. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2594 (1978). Section
101 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act enacts into positive law Title 11 of the United States
Code and embodies the substantive law of bankruptcy. In this article citations to section 101
are hereinafter cited as "Bankruptcy Code of 1978" and include the appropriate section
number from Title 11, United States Code.
Other parts of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 will hereinafter be cited as "Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978" followed by the appropriate section number from that act. In
addition, when a section of the Act amends or adds a new section of the United States Code,
that amendment or addition will also be cited to the appropriate United States Code
section.
23. The Bankruptcy Code consists mostly of substantive law. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2075,
as amended by § 247 of Title II of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the Supreme Court
will retain rulemaking authority to define relevant procedure (e.g., defining who is an "inter-
ested party" for purposes of raising objections, establishing time limits for filing proofs of
claims, and establishing the ground rules for various hearings). Prior to the 1978 amend-
ment, § 2075 authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate rules which would supercede the
[Vol. 3:13
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chapters (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15; there are no even-numbered
chapters). Chapters 1, 3, and 5 apply generally to all types of bank-
ruptcy proceedings and deal with such matters as definitions and
rules of construction, powers of the court, case administration,
powers of the trustee, procedures for filing a case, creditors' rights
and duties, and the rights and duties of debtors. Chapter 15 estab-
lishes the powers and duties of the United States trustee in those
specified jurisdictions wherein the office is created. In general, the
last three digits of a chapter 15 section number refer to another
section of the Bankruptcy Code that is amended, supplemented, or
replaced by the particular chapter 15 section.
Chapters 7, 9, 11, and 13 deal with substantive law applicable
to each of the four different types of bankruptcy proceedings.
Chapter 7 governs liquidation or "straight bankruptcy," wherein
the debtor's assets are surrendered to the court, exempt assets re-
turned to the debtor, the remaining assets either liquidated or set
aside to secured creditors, and the proceeds distributed among
creditors according to a statutorily prescribed scheme.24 In return,
the debtor is accorded a discharge of all but a few enumerated
types of debts unless he or she has committed one of a few speci-
fied acts.25
Chapters 9, 11, and 13 all involve debtor rehabilitation pro-
ceedings which, as distinguished from liquidation, look toward re-
organization of the debtor's financial structure, payment of debts
out of future earnings, and generally result in a discharge of debts
1898 Act to the extent of any inconsistency. By order of April 24, 1973, the Court promul-
gated a comprehensive set of official rules and forms which, in many cases, made substantial
changes in substantive bankruptcy law. Amended § 2075 limits the Court's rulemaking au-
thority to rules that are consistent with the Bankruptcy Code and, until such new rules are
promulgated, § 405(d) of the Reform Act provides that the old rules will apply to the extent
not inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code. The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules
of the Judicial Conference of the United States has promulgated for local adoption a set of
Suggested Interim Bankruptcy Rules designed to aid parties "applying existing bankruptcy
rules where appropriate under the new code, and in filling gaps in present rules created by
the new legislation." ADVISORY CoMMITTEE ON BANKRUPTCY RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, SUGGESTED INTERIM BANKRUPTCY RULES 1 (1979).
24. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 726. Section 726 generally governs the priority of dis-
tribution of liquidation proceeds among general creditors. Creditors with secured claims will
receive prior distribution of collateral or its value under § 362 (relief from the automatic
stay), § 554 (abandonment of estate property), or § 725 (distribution of certain property in
which an entity other than the estate has an interest).
25. Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 accords the debtor a general discharge
of debts unless 1 of 10 enumerated conditions exist. Section 523 of the Code lists nine types
of debts which are excepted from the § 727 discharge.
1980]
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upon compliance with a court-approved rehabilitation plan."'
Chapter 9 applies to rehabilitation of municipalities, chapter 11 to
reorganization of business entities, and chapter 13 to rehabilitation
of individuals with regular income. While, unless otherwise speci-
fied, the provisions of chapters 1, 3, and 5 apply generally to pro-
ceedings brought under chapters 7, 9, 11, and 13, the provisions of
7, 9, 11, and 13 only apply to proceedings under each respective
chapter.
Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court
One of the more serious defects of the Bankruptcy Act of
189827 as amended by the Chandler Act in 1938,28 and principal
reason for the reform movement, was its failure to vest in the
bankruptcy court pervasive jurisdiction to decide all issues arising
in or relating to the administration of a bankruptcy proceeding.
Section 2 of the 1898 Act sought to describe comprehensively
bankruptcy court jurisdiction as "original" (but not exclusive) to
decide certain enumerated issues and exercise certain enumerated
powers in a bankruptcy proceeding-including the power to
"[c]ause the estates of bankrupts to be collected.12 9 Problems did
not arise with respect to collecting estate property in possession of
the bankrupt or deciding adverse claims against such property
since jurisdiction over the property emanated from personal juris-
dicton over the bankrupt. However, section 23 provided that dis-
putes over property held adversely to the trustee or receiver were
to be decided "in the same manner and to the same extent as
though such [bankruptcy] proceedings had not been instituted and
such controversies had been between the bankrupts and such ad-
verse claimants," and that such suits "be brought or prosecuted
only in the courts where the bankrupt might have brought or pros-
ecuted them if proceedings under this Act had not been initiated,
26. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 944(b) (municipal debt adjustment), § 1141 (business
reorganization), and § 1328 (individual debt adjustment).
27. Act of July 1, 1898, An Act to establish a uniform system of Bankruptcy through-
out the United States, Pub. L. No. 171, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
28. Act of June 22, 1938, An Act to Amend an Act entitled "An Act to establish a
uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States," Pub. L. No. 696, 52 Stat. 840
(1938). The official title of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, was shortened to the
"Bankruptcy Act" by act of Congress in 1950. Act of December 20, 1950, Pub. L. No. 879, 64
Stat. 1113 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Act of 1898].
29. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 2.
[Vol. 3:13
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unless by consent of the defendant.""0 Thus, the trustee was com-
pelled to bring a plenary action in a nonbankruptcy forum.
The result of the above allocation of jurisdiction was devastat-
ing to the efficiency of the bankruptcy court. Unnecessary delay
was caused by a trustee having to litigate in state or federal
nonbankruptcy courts to recover property in the possession of an
adverse claimant. 1 Bankruptcy courts wasted much time over liti-
gation to determine whether property was in the actual or con-
structive possession of the bankrupt so as to fall within the sum-
mary jurisdiction of the court, or whether the adverse claimant had
actually or impliedly consented to the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court. It was apparent that a more comprehensive grant of
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court would serve to reduce the time
and money spent on litigation of jurisdictional issues and "foster
the development of a more uniform, cohesive body of substantive
and procedural law."3"
Section 1471 of Title 28 of the United States Codess cures the
jurisdictional overlap created by the 1898 Act by granting the
bankruptcy court greatly expanded jurisdiction. Section 1471 pro-
vides that bankruptcy courts shall exercise original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases filed under the Code and original but not
exclusive jurisdiction over all proceedings "arising in or related to"
bankruptcy cases.8 4 The non-exclusivity limitation is not intended
as a jurisdictional restriction but rather legitimates the court's
power to abstain from hearing a particular proceeding if it feels
some other forum should more appropriately decide the dispute.
That the bankruptcy court has complete discretion whether to ab-
stain or not is made clear by the nonreviewability of the abstention
decision.88 Since section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code automatically
stays the commencement or continuation of any judicial or admin-
istrative action against the debtor or his property, the bankruptcy
court is assured of unfettered power to decide all bankruptcy re-
lated issues unless and until it decides not to.8
30. Id. § 23.
31. See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 88-91; COMM. ON THE JUDICI-
ARY, supra note 18, at 43-52; MAcLACHLAN, supra note 8, at 203-14.
32. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 90.
33. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 241, adding 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1978).
34. Id. § 1471(b).
35. Id. § 1471(d).
36. Since 1) 28 U.S.C. § 1471 vests in the bankruptcy court original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases filed under Title I of the Reform Act, and 2) relief from the auto-
1980]
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Along with the grant of pervasive jurisdiction, the powers of
the bankruptcy court are greatly expanded. Section 1481 of the
amendments to Title 28 of the United States Code grants the
bankruptcy court all the "powers of a court of equity, law, and ad-
miralty," the only exceptions being that it cannot enjoin another
court nor punish most cases of criminal contempt.3 7 Section 105 of
the Code prohibits the court from appointing a receiver.3 8 The
same section, however, rounds out the comprehensive grant of
power to bankruptcy courts by making it clear that they "may is-
sue any order, process, or judgment" appropriate for exercising
their functions under the Code." Thus, the new bankruptcy court
will assume an elevated status under the Code as a truly indepen-
dent court fully equal to the responsibilities of expeditiously
resolving all disputes arising in the administration of bankruptcy
estates.
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States felt that concomitant with the expanded jurisdiction of the
court, referees should be elevated in status and made independent
of district court judges.40 H.R. 8200 implemeted these recommen-
dations by providing for executive appointment, life tenure, and a
salary equivalent to that paid to district court judges.41 Senate
concerns over excessive elevation in status resulted in the compro-
mise embodied in sections 152, 153, and 154 of the amendments to
Title 28 of the United States Code. Bankruptcy judges will be ap-
pointed by the President, subject to Senate confirmation, for four-
matic stay of § 362 of the Code may be granted only by the bankruptcy court, the grant of
original but not exclusive jurisdiction to decide civil matters related to a bankruptcy case
permits another forum to decide the issue, but only if the bankruptcy court decides to exer-
cise its unreviewable power to abstain under 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d).
37. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 241, adding 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1978).
38. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 105. The prohibition amounts somewhat to a change
of form over substance. Under § 2a.(3) of the 1898 Act, the bankruptcy court was authorized
to appoint a receiver to manage the debtor's property between the time an involuntary peti-
tion was filed and the time of a subsequent order of relief. Because § 303(g) in a liquidation
case and § 1104 in a reorganization case authorizes the court to appoint an interim trustee
to manage a debtor's business pending action on an involuntary petition, appointment of a
receiver would be unnecessary.
39. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 105(a). The bankruptcy court is accorded all powers of
a Court of the United States under the federal All Writs Statute [28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976)].
This is accomplished by amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 451 effected by § 213 of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978.
40. COMMISSON REPORT, supra note 3, at 94-96.
41. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 152-54 (1977).
[Vol. 3:13
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teen-year terms at a salary of $50,000 per year.42 The Judicial
Councils within each circuit may make nonbinding recommenda-
tions to the President concerning judges to be appointed within
the circuit. 3 During the five-year transition period, current refer-
ees will serve as bankruptcy judges." Appointed judges will take
office March 1, 1984."5
The Commission also felt that the unnecessary involvement of
the referee in administrative matters (e.g., having to give formal
approval to routine actions of the trustee as to which no interested
party had objected) was a waste of judicial time and caused need-
less delay in closing estates. 4" Additionally, and perhaps more im-
portantly, administrative duties often brought the referee into ex
parte contact with the debtor, the creditors, and the trustee creat-
ing, at a minimum, the appearance of partiality.47 H.R. 8200 pro-
posed a complete separation of administrative and judicial respon-
sibilities.48 The function of the judge would be confined largely to
dispute resolution, and trustees would have greater administrative
powers and responsibilities to be exercised, to a large extent, free
from judicial supervision. To upgrade the quality of administrative
services and make trustees independent of judges, H.R. 8200 would
have established the office of United States trustee in each district
to supervise estate administration and serve as trustee in cases
where private trustees were unable or unwilling to serve.49 The
Senate Bill, S. 2266,50 contained no such provision, demonstrating
a preference to retain the system of judicially appointed private
trustees under the supervision of the referee. The compromise ef-
fected by the Code is that the United States trustee system was
implemented in selected judicial districts' as a five-year pilot pro-
ject. At the end of that time, the project will be evaluated and if
successful, expanded, if not, dropped.
42. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 201, adding 28 U.S.C. §§ 152-54 (1978).
43. Id., 28 U.S.C. § 152 (1978).
44. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 404(b).
45. Id.
46. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 3 and 5-8.
47. Id. at 92-4.
48. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 581-89 (1977); COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra
note 18, at 99-109.
49. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 581-89 (1977).
50. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
51. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 1501 and Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 224, ad-
ding 28 U.S.C. § 581 (1978).
1980]
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Section 586 of the amendments to Title 28 of the United
States Code lists the duties of the United States trustee.52 His ini-
tial responsibility under the Code is to establish, maintain, and su-
pervise a panel of private trustees who will serve in cases under
chapters 7 and 11 of the Code (unless creditors elect a trustee from
outside the panel). The United States trustee will serve as trustee
in chapter 7 cases where no private trustee is willing or able to
serve (e.g., "no asset" cases), but is prohibited from serving in a
chapter 11 case.5" Trustee appointments (except in chapter 11
cases) will be made by the United States trustee rather than the
judge. In chapter 13 cases, the United States trustee has the option
either to appoint a private standing trustee or designate one or
more of his assistants as standing trustee.5' Perhaps most impor-
tant, the general supervision of case administration under all chap-
ters of the Code is vested in the United States trustee rather than
the bankruptcy judge.
In jurisdictions not within the pilot project, the court will con-
tinue to be responsible for appointing trustees (unless creditors
choose to elect one) and supervising them in administering cases.
In two important respects, however, the judge is relieved from ad-
ministrative duties. Under section 341, the bankruptcy judge is
prohibited from attending the first creditors' meeting so as to
avoid being influenced by the debtor's petition, statement of af-
fairs, schedules, and answers to questions given during the credi-
tors' examination when later called upon to rule in litigation over
exemptions, claims, or discharge. A second provision which should
serve to remove much administrative burden from the bankruptcy
judge involves a rule of construction found in section 102 of the
Code. Numerous sections of the Code give the trustee authority to
take various administrative actions "after notice and hearing."'"
Section 102 construes that phrase to mean only notice and an op-
portunity for a hearing. 56 Therefore, if notice of proposed action is
52. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 224, adding 28 U.S.C. § 586 (1978).
53. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 151104(c).
54. Id. § 151302.
55. See, e.g., § 363(b) (power of the trustee to sell or lease business property other
than in the ordinary course of business "after notice and hearing") and § 554(a) (power of
trustee to abandon estate property "after notice and hearing").
56. Section 102 of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 provides in part:
In this title-
(1) "after notice and a hearing", or a similar phrase-(A) means after such no-
tice as is appropriate in the particular circumstances, and such opportunity for a
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given by the trustee to interested parties and no objection to the
action is lodged in the form of a request for a hearing, the action
may be taken without securing the pro forma approval of the
judge. The administrative workload of the bankruptcy judge
should be lightened considerably even in those jurisdictions not in-
cluded within the United States trustee pilot project.
Commencement of a Case
A person or entity who files a petition to take advantage of
any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, or against whom a petition is
filed, is referred to as a "debtor" rather than a "bankrupt" under
the Code.57 Section 109 provides that any "person" (defined by
section 101 to include an individual, partnership, or corporaton
which is not a governmental unit) except a railroad, bank, savings
and loan association, or insurance company may be a debtor in a
chapter 7 liquidation case." Any person who may be a debtor
under chapter 7 (except a stockholder or commodity broker) and
additionally, a railroad, may be a debtor under a chapter 11 reor-
ganization.59 Debtor qualifications under chapter 13 represent a
major change over the 1898 Act insofar as debtor rehabilitation
protection is extended to virtually all salaried individuals, and may
now, for the first time, be invoked by sole proprietor businesses.
Any "individual with regular income" (regardless of source) who
owes fixed unsecured debts of less than $100,000 and fixed secured
debts of less than $350,000 may file a chapter 13 petition.60 Joint
petitions by spouses are authorized provided one spouse has regu-
lar income and the aggregate debts of both spouses do not exceed
the above dollar amounts.
61
A voluntary case is commenced, as under the 1898 Act, by the
filing of a petition with the bankruptcy court requesting relief
under the appropriate chapter. The filing of a petition now consti-
tutes "an order for relief" rather than an "adjudication of bank-
ruptcy."'62 An involuntary petition may only be filed under chap-
ters 7 or 11 of the Code, but may not be filed against a charitable
hearing as is appropriate in the particular circumstances[.]
57. See, e.g., §§ 109, 521, and 1321.
58. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 109(b).
59. Id. § 109(d).
60. Id. § 109(e).
61. Id.
62. Id. § 301.
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corporation or a person (including a corporation or partnership)
who earns at least 80 % of its income from a farming operation.8
The creditors filing an involuntary petition must meet certain
qualifications. Section 303 of the Code follows prior law insofar as
only one creditor holding a noncontingent claim (which need not
be allowable) need file if the debtor has less than twelve such cred-
itors." If the debtor has twelve or more creditors, three or more
creditors holding noncontingent claims must sign. In either case,
the creditors signing the petition must hold noncontingent claims
of at least $5000 in the aggregate, in excess of any security or col-
lateral. Section 303(b)(2) provides that for purposes of computing
the requisite number of creditors signing the petition, insiders
(creditors generally having either a close business or personal rela-
tionship to the debtor), fully secured creditors, and creditors who
have received voidable transfers of property from the debtor may
not be counted.
Under the 1898 Act, creditors seeking to force a debtor into
bankruptcy had to prove that the debtor committed one of six acts
of bankruptcy within four months prior to the petition." The
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States criti-
cized this requirement as being an unwarranted burden on creditor
interests which caused unnecessary delay and dissipation of the es-
tate between the time the debtor first ceased paying his bills and
the filing of a petition, and recommended its abolition." The Code
followed this recommendation by abolishing all acts of bankruptcy.
Instead, all the Code requires is that the debtor currently not be
paying his debts as they become due or, in the alternative, that an
assignee for benefit of creditors, a receiver, or an executing creditor
has taken possession of substantially all the debtor's property.
6 7
Section 305 gives the court discretion to dismiss a petition, not-
withstanding the existence of grounds for relief, if the interests of
both the debtor and creditors would better be served." This dis-
cretion will likely be exercised where a pre-petition general receiv-
ership, general assignment for benefit of creditors, or contractual
arrangement promises to result in a more efficient liquidation and
63. Id. 9 303(a).
64. Id. 9 303(b).
65. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 3a. and 3b.
66. COMMISSON REPORT, supra note 3, at 14-15.
67. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 303(h).
68. Id. § 305(a)(1).
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distribution if left undisturbed.69
Section 303(f) and (g) give the court discretion either to allow
the business debtor to remain in possession of his business be-
tween the time the petition is filed and the time it is acted upon,
or, after notice and hearing, appoint a trustee to take possession of
and manage the business.7 0 To protect the debtor against irrepara-
ble damages caused by ultimately unsuccessful petitions, section
303(i) provides that petitioning creditors may be assessed costs,
damages, and attorney's fees if a petition is dismissed." Punitive
damages may be assessed if the court finds that a petition was filed
in bad faith.72 Furthermore, to facilitate the debtor-in-possession
effectively continuing his business after an involuntary petition has
been filed, section 502(f) and section 507(a) together grant second
priority status to creditors who extend unsecured credit to the
debtor between the time the petition is filed and the order of
relief. 78
69. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 18, at 325.
70. Section 303(f) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 makes it clear that during the time
between the filing of, an involuntary petition under either chapter 7 or 11 and subsequent
action on the peitition, a debtor may continue to manage and operate a business unless and
until the bankruptcy court orders otherwise. Furthermore, an interim trustee may only be
appointed if certain conditions exist. Section 303(g) provides that in a chapter 7 liquidation
case, such appointment may be made only "if necessary to preserve the property of the
estate or to prevent loss to the estate." In a chapter 11 case, a trustee may be appointed
only pursuant to the following standards:
(1) for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismangement
of the aflairs of the debtor by current management, either before or after the com-
mencement of the case, or similar cause, but not including the number of holders
of securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor; or
(2) if such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security hold-
ers, and other interests of the estate, without regard to the number of holders of
securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor. Bank-
ruptcy Code of 1978, § 1104(a).
71. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 303(i)(1). The court, upon dismissing a petition, has
discretion to assess actual damages against petitioning parties unless the petition was dis-
missed upon consent of all petitioners and the debtor or unless the debtor has waived his
right to damages. Damages are measured by costs, a reasonable attorney's fee, or "any dam-
ages proximately caused by the taking of possession of the debtor's property by a trustee"
under § 303(i)(1)(c) or § 1104 of the Code. While the wording of 303(i) would indicate that
the three types of damages are to be awarded in the alternative, the House Judiciary Com-
mittee Report indicates that damages are cumulative and the word "or" should be read as
conjunctive. "'Or' is not exclusive in this paragraph. The court may grant any or all of the
damages provided for under the provisions." COMM. ON THE JuDiciARY, supra note 18, at 324.
72. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 303(i)(2).
73. Section 502(f) of the Code renders allowable in the same manner as any pre-peti-
tion claim, a claim that arises in the ordinary course of the debtor's business during the
interim between the filing of an involuntary petition and the earlier of the appointment of a
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It is essential to efficient and equitable bankruptcy adminis-
tration that the trustee be able to collect and liquidate the debtor's
estate free from the interference of creditors scrambling for advan-
tage. To this end, section 362 provides that a bankruptcy petition
under any chapter, voluntary or involuntary, operates as an auto-
matic stay against virtually all creditor collection activity.7' Credi-
tors are prohibited from 1) beginning or continuing legal actions to
collect debts, 2) employing legal process to collect debts or enforce
judgments or liens against estate property, 3) doing any act to cre-
ate, perfect, or enforce security interests in connection with claims
that arose before the filing of the petition, 4) doing any act to col-
lect or recover a pre-petition claim against the debtor, 5) setting
off mutual debts, or 6) commencing or continuing any action
against the debtor in the United States Tax Court. Calling a
debtor to request payment of a claim would fall within the prohibi-
tion of the section 362 stay.
Section 362(b) exempts from the stay certain activity which
either poses no threat to the estate or which is predicated on state
law upon which a creditor could have relied and which would have
supported the action but for the intervention of bankruptcy. Ex-
empted from the stay are 1) commencement or continuation of
criminal actions against the debtor, 2) actions to collect mainte-
nance, support, or alimony from non-estate property, 3) actions
(other than taking possession of property) to perfect interests in
property under state laws granting grace periods within which
perfection may be made and protection against intervening inter-
trustee or an order of relief. Section 507(a)(2) accords such allowable unsecured claims sec-
ond priority after administrative expenses.
74. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 362(a). The purpose of the § 362 automatic stay is
described by the House Judiciary Committee as follows:
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the
bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops
all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the
debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan or simply to be relieved of
the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy. The automatic stay also
provides creditor protection. Without it, certain creditors would be able to pursue
their own remedies against the debtor's property. Those who acted first would
obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to the detriment of other credi-
tors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under
which all creditors are treated equally. A race of diligence by creditors for the
debtor's assets prevents that. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 18, at 340.
An additional function of the stay, not mentioned by the Committee on the Judiciary, is to
give the trustee in a liquidation case time to assess the estate and claims of creditors free
from the pressures of creditors.
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ests in the property effectuated, 4) any generally applicable right
of a seller to recover goods received by the buyer while insolvent
(e.g., section 2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code) provided
written demand for the goods is made within ten days of receipt, 5)
commencement or continuation of governmental police power ac-
tions to the extent regulatory in nature rather than for collection
of claims, 6) certain commodity futures setoffs, 7) certain mortgage
foreclosure actions by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, and 8) the issuance of tax deficiency notices by govern-
mental units.75
The comprehensive prohibition of creditor collection activity
under section 362 is not designed to cut off irrevocably all collec-
tion activity against estate property, but rather, to give the trustee
breathing space within which to collect the estate and evaluate
claims of secured creditors to estate property. Subsections (c), (d),
(e), and (f) of section 362 establish rules governing termination of
the stay.76 Subsection (c) automatically terminates the stay of ac-
tions against estate property when such property ceases to be
property of the estate (e.g., by sale, abandonment, or exemption),
and terminates as to any other act at the earlier of closing the case,
dismissing the case, or the granting or denial of a discharge (unless
the debtor in a chapter 7 case is a partnership or corporation).
Creditors may receive earlier relief from the stay by applica-
tion to the court. Subsection (d) of section 362 requires the court,
after notice and opportunity for a hearing, to terminate or modify
a stay "for cause" including inadequate protection of a secured
creditor's interest in property and, with respect to fully secured
creditors who wish to repossess collateral, to terminate the stay of
acts against estate property if the debtor has no equity in the
property and the property is not needed to effectuate a reorganiza-
75. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 362(b). The House Judiciary Committee emphasized
that while such actions are not stayed automatically by the filing of the petition the bank-
ruptcy court has ample power to enjoin any action not covered by the stay: 1) Section 105
authorizes the court to issue orders necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
Title I, 2) bankruptcy courts fall within the coverage of the federal All Writs Statute [28
U.S.C. § 1651 (1976)), and 3) under Title II, § 241 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act [28 U.S.C.
§ 1481 (Supp. 1976)] bankruptcy courts are given all powers of a court of law, equity, or
admiralty. Removing the enumerated actions from the scope of the automatic stay serves to
require the court, upon motion of an interested party, to determine on a case-by-case basis
whether such action should be stayed. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 18, at 342.
76. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 362.
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tion. To encourage expedited hearings on secured creditor mo-
tions for relief, the Code provides that a stay of acts against prop-
erty of the estate terminates automatically thirty days after a
request for relief unless a hearing is held and the stay is ordered
continued. 8
Collecting and Liquidating the Estate
The filing of a petition under any chapter of the Bankruptcy
Code creates an estate over which the bankruptcy court and trus-
tee will have certain powers of alienation and supervision which
will vary depending upon the particular chapter. The principal
duty of a trustee in a chapter 7 case is to collect and liquidate the
estate and make final distribution to creditors. These duties are
more specifically described by section 704 of the Code as 1) collect-
ing the debtor's property, 2) setting aside exempt property to the
debtor and fully-encumbered property to creditors whose claims
cannot be avoided, 3) liquidating the remainder, 4) accounting for
all property received, 5) investigating the debtor's financial affairs,
6) opposing the debtor's discharge if warranted, 7) filing periodic
financial statements with the court and governmental taxing enti-
ties in the case of a business that is authorized to be operated dur-
ing administration, 8) making final distribution, and 9) filing with
the bankruptcy court a final accounting of all collections and dis-
bursements.7 9 The duties of the trustee under other chapters are
specifically described in those chapters, but generally involve ad-
ministering or supervising the administration of the debtor's estate
under a plan of business or financial reorganization.
Regardless of the chapter under which a case is filed, one of
the first duties of the trustee will be to identify that property
which is included in the estate. Under the 1898 Act, whether or not
property was included within the estate under section 70a. de-
77. The automatic stay is not intended to cut off secured party interests in estate
property but rather to give the trustee time to evaluate and deal with secured claims in an
orderly fashion. The trustee is empowered by § 363 of the Code to use or sell estate prop-
erty, including fully-encumbered property, provided the secured party is given protection
against depreciation of his interest. A secured creditor is entitled to relief from the stay if
adequate protection is not provided, or if collateral the secured party wishes to reposses is
not needed by the estate and is not subject to any equity of the debtor. In a liquidation
case, the trustee will likely wish to liquidate collateral in which the debtor has equity and
pay over to the secured party the value of the secured claim.
78. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 362(e).
79. Id. § 704.
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pended largely upon whether it was exempt under state law (and if
so, excluded from the estate), and whether the property was alien-
able by the debtor or subject to creditors' process under state law
(and if so, included in the estate unless exempt). 80 Tying the bank-
ruptcy estate so closely to state law, with all its variances, had the
effect of creating inconsistencies and conflicts in a body of national
law intended to be uniform. The philosophy behind section 541 of
the Code is to bring all property interests of the debtor within the
jurisdicion of bankruptcy administration, whether or not exempt
and without reference to state laws respecting transferability or
amenability to collection process. 81
Section 541 provides that the estate shall consist of the follow-
ing property:
(1) All legal and equitable interests of the debtor existing as
of the day the petition is filed except a power of appointment
that the debtor may not exercise in his own behalf or the
debtor's equitable interest in a spendthrift trust. This would
include documents, tangible and intangible interests, causes of
action, exempt property, possessory interests, title-virtually
any property interest that could conceivably be of value to the
estate. (Exempt property will later be set aside to the debtor
under section 522.)
(2) All interests of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in com-
munity property under sole or joint control of the debtor, or
subject to a claim against the debtor. (The spouse and creditors
will both then participate in distribution and the bankruptcy
court will decide the extent to which the property should be
subjected to creditors' claims.)
(3) Any interest in property that the trustee recovers under
sections 542 and 543 (property acquired from a receiver, as-
signee for benefit of creditors, or other custodian of the
debtor's property), section 544 (transfers voidable under fed-
eral or state law), section 547 (preferential transfers), and sec-
tion 548 (fraudulent transfers).
(4) Any property acquired by the debtor within 180 days after
the petition a) by devise, bequest, or inheritance; b) under a
divorce decree or settlement; or c) as beneficiary of a life insur-
ance plan.
80. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70a.
81. COMM. ON THE JUDICRY, supra note 18, at 175-77.
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(5) Proceeds, offspring, rents, or profits of estate property.
(6) Any interest in property acquired by the estate after the
petition is filed.8"
It is important to note that what is acquired by the trustee as
part of the estate is the "debtor's interest" in property. Any title
acquired as part of the estate is of the same quality as that of the
debtor. If the debtor owns a joint interest, the trustee acquires a
joint interest. Any defects in title are defects as to the trustee.
Property encumbered by mortgages or security interests in favor of
third parties is acquired subject to those encumbrances and the
trustee acquires only the debtor's equity. If property is fully en-
cumbered, the trustee acquires only the debtor's possessory inter-
est. The trustee, of course, may later improve upon the debtor's
interest through his avoidance powers under sections 544, 545, 547,
and 548 of the Code.
It is not uncommon for a lease, security agreement, or club
membership to contractually restrict transfer of the property or
provide for the termination of the lessee's, debtor's, or member's
interest in such property upon the event of insolvency or bank-
ruptcy. Section 70b. of the 1898 Act specifically validated forfei-
ture provisions in leases.83 Section 541(c) of the Code assures that
all of the debtor's interests in property become part of the estate
for a "coherent evaluation of its value and transferability"84 by in-
cluding such property notwithstanding restrictions on transfer or
provisions terminating the debtor's interest upon insolvency or
bankruptcy.8 5 It should be emphasized that section 541(c) serves
merely to bring property into the estate and does not guarantee
that the trustee will be able to dispose of the property. The trus-
82. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 541. In addition to bringing exempt and inalienable
property into the estate, § 541 expands the definition of estate property over old § 70a. in
other significant respects. Section 541(a)(2) brings into the estate both the interests of the
debtor and the debtor's spouse in most community property. The bankruptcy court will
then determine the extent to which such property should be subjected to claims against the
debtor and abandon the rest to the spouse. Under § 541(a)(3), property recovered by the
trustee under his avoidance powers becomes estate property. Section 541(a)(5) continues the
policy of capturing inheritances of the debtor acquired within 6 months of bankruptcy but
enlarges the types of property subject to capture if acquired within 6 months of the petition
to include property acquired under a divorce decree or property settlement and proceeds
acquired as beneficiary of a life insurance policy.
83. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70b.
84. COMM. ON THE JuDicARy, supra note 18, at 176.
85. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 541(c)(1).
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tee's power of sale or lease of estate property is covered by section
363(1) which invalidates only forfeitures conditioned upon bank-
ruptcy or insolvency8s Thus, while general restrictions on transfer-
ability will not prevent property from becoming part of the estate,
they will be effective against the trustee so as to prevent his liqui-
dating the property.
Section 541 creates the bankruptcy estate. Since inclusion of
an asset within the estate is not dependent upon possession, the
trustee must acquire possession of property for purposes of use,
sale, or lease under section 36387 or distribution under sections 725
and 726.58 Under section 521, a debtor is required to turn over to
the trustee property in his possession. 9 Property is acquired from
third persons under the turnover provisions of sections 542 and
543. Section 543 deals with property in the possession of a "custo-
dian" which is defined by section 101(10) to mean a receiver, as-
signee for benefit of creditors, or any other person appointed to
take possession of the debtor's property and administer it for the
benefit of creditors. 90 Under section 543, a custodian who acquires
knowledge of the commencement of a case is prohibited from tak-
ing any action with respect to the property (e.g., administering, liq-
uidating, or distributing it) except as is necessary to preserve it.f"
86. Id. § 363(1).
87. Id. § 363. Section 363 is the statutory authority for the trustee to either use or
dispose of estate property under either chapter 7, 11 or 13.
88. Id. §§ 725 and 726. Section 725 provides for distribution in a liquidation case of
estate property in which an entity other than the estate has an interest before final distribu-
tion is made to general creditors. Section 726 provides for final distribution of estate prop-
erty to general creditors. Section 521, 542 and 543 are the three statutory provisions grant-
ing the trustee power to acquire possession of estate property so that the § 363, § 725, and §
726 powers and duties can be effectively exercised.
89. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 521(3). The debtor's intentional failure to turn over
estate property to the trustee would be grounds for denial of a discharge under §
727(a)(2)(B).
90. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 101(10):
(10) "custodian" means-
(A) receiver or trustee of any of the property of the debtor, appointed
in a case or proceeding not under this title;
(B) assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of the debtor's
creditors; or
(C) trustee, receiver, or agent under applicable law, or under a con-
tract, that is appointed or authorized to take charge of property of the
debtor for the purpose of enforcing a lien against such property, or for
the purpose of general administration of such property for the benefit of
the debtor's creditors.
91. Id. § 543(a). Perishable goods could be sold, for example. Nonperishable goods
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The custodian must then turn over to the trustee all property that
the trustee can use, lease, or sell under section 363, that is in the
custodian's possession on the day he acquires knowledge of the
bankruptcy proceeding. Along with that property, he must prepare
an accounting of all property of the debtor that ever came into the
custodian's possession. Section 543(c) requires the court to com-
pensate the custodian for services rendered and expenses incurred
by the custodian in administering the property. Section 543(c) also
subjects the custodian to liability for any improper or excessive
pre-petition disbursements neither sanctioned by applicable law
nor approved by a competent court.
Turnover of property in the hands of a third person other
than a custodian is governed by section 542. Any entity, other than
a custodian, who has possession of estate property that the trustee
can use, sell, or lease under section 363(a), must surrender the
property to the trustee or account for its value.92 Such entity is
relieved from this responsibility if the property is of inconsequen-
tial value or benefit to the estate."3 Subsection (b) provides that
any entity that owes a matured or currently payable debt which is
estate property must pay the debt to the trustee unless the debt is
subject to setoff under section 553." Subsection (c) protects enti-
ties who make good faith transfers of estate property without
knowledge of the commencement of a case in violation of subsec-
tion (a) or (b). Such transfers are effective and impose no liability
on the transferor, the only exception being that any good faith
setoff of mutual debts covered by the section 362(a)(7) automatic
stay may be set aside by the trustee (although it may later be al-
lowed under section 553).95 Insurance companies who are contrac-
could not.
92. Id. § 542(a).
93. Section 542(a) distinguishes between use value and monetary value. Turnover of
property which is of no monetary value to the estate would be required by § 542(a) if the
trustee's use of it would be beneficial in winding down or rehabilitating a business.
94. Under § 541(a)(1), the debtor's choses in action and claiins against third parties
are estate property. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 18 at 367. Section 553 permits a
creditor to offset mutual debts between such creditor and the debtor. Section 542(b) re-
quires a third party who owes a currently payable § 541(a)(1) debt to the debtor to pay it
over to the trustee unless the third party has a § 553 claim which may be offset. If this is the
case, only the net claim of the debtor against the third party need be paid over under §
542(b). For example, if the debtor had $1,000 in a deposit account at First Bank but owed
First Bank $500 on a defaulted promissory note, First Bank would only have to turn over
$500 to the trustee.
95. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 542(c).
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tually required to automatically make premium loans out of prop-
erty otherwise within the estate to prevent a policy from lapsing"6
are protected by subsection (d), and under subsection (e), attor-
neys, accountants, or other persons possessing recorded informa-
tion (books, documents, and records) relating to the financial af-
fairs of the debtor which is not estate property may be required to
turn the information over to the court. The purpose of the subsec-
tion (which had no counterpart under the 1898 Act) is to deprive
"accountants and attorneys of the leverage they have today, under
state law lien provisions, to receive payment in full ahead of other
creditors when the information they hold is necessary to the ad-
ministration of the estate.'
'97
Administrative Powers of the Trustee
The administrative powers needed by a trustee to liquidate an
estate in a chapter 7 case or to effectively operate a corporation or
business in a chapter 11 or 13 case are granted by sections 361-366
of the Code.8 The section 362 automatic stay, discussed previ-
ously,99 guarantees that the trustee will be able to collect and ad-
minister the estate in an orderly fashion free from annoying and
disruptive creditor collection activity. Section 363 gives the trustee
broad powers of alienation over estate property, so as to maximize
benefit to the estate while at the same time assuring protection to
third parties having interests in such property. The specific protec-
tion to which third party interests are entitled is described in sec-
tion 361. The trustee is given powers to enhance his ability to ob-
tain credit while operating or supervising the operation of a
debtor's business by section 364, and section 366 lessens the ability
of a utility company to frustrate rehabilitation or reorganization by
cutting off service. Finally, section 365 continues the trustee's
power under the 1898 Act' to reject, assume, or assign executory
contracts and leases.
96. Id. § 542(d). The loan value of a life insurance policy is property of the estate
under § 541(a)(1). To the extent a life insurance company, pursuant to its contractual obli-
gation, automatically applies part of the policy loan value toward payment of a premium, it
is reserving to itself estate property that § 542(a) would otherwise require to be paid over to
the trustee. Section 542(d) permits such payment since the result ultimately benefits the
estate by preserving estate property that would otherwise have been forfeited.
97. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 18, at 369-70.
98. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, §§ 361-66.
99. See text at pp. 15-18, supra.
100. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70b.
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1. Use, Sale, or Lease of Property
a. Procedure For Use, Sale, or Lease
Under section 363(b), the trustee has the unqualified power,
after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, to sell, use, or lease
estate property other than in the ordinary course of business. So
long as no objection to the proposed action is made, normal estate
liquidation may be had without court approval.' 0 ' If the business
of a debtor is authorized to be operated under sections 721, 1108,
or 1304, subsection (c) of section 363 authorizes the trustee to sell,
use, or lease estate property, other than cash collateral, in the ordi-
nary course of business without notice or opportunity for a hear-
ing. Cash collateral is defined by subsection (a) of section 363 to
mean "cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, securities,
deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents in which the estate and
an entity other than the estate have an interest." The trustee may
not use, sell, or lease cash collateral unless each party having an
interest in the collateral consents or the court approves of the dis-
position.10 2 All cash collateral acquired by the trustee and not dis-
posed of must be strictly accounted for and segregated to protect
the secured party against loss of security through alienation or
commingling.'03 Subsection (d) of section 363 expressly conditions
the trustee's power of use, sale, or lease of estate property upon the
continued life and applicability of the automatic stay as against a
creditor seeking to satisfy a claim out of estate property. Should a
secured creditor obtain relief from section 362 and be permitted by
the court to repossess collateral in the possession of the trustee,
the trustee's power of alienation over the collateral under section
363 ceases.'"
b. Sale of Encumbered Property
As a general matter, a trustee may sell property free and clear
of any third party interest (except that of a joint tenant, tenant in
common, or tenant by the entirety) only if one of the following
conditions is met:
101. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 102(1).
102. Id. § 363(c)(2).
103. Id. § 363(c)(4).
104. Relief from the automatic stay is governed by subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f) of
§ 362 and is discussed at page 17 of the text, infra.
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(1) nonbankruptcy law permits the sale free of such interest;
(2) the holder of the interest consents;
(3) the interest is a lien and the sale price of the property is
greater than the lien;
(4) there is a bona fide dispute over the validity of the inter-
est; or
(5) the party could legally be compelled to accept money in
lieu of its interest.100
Regardless of the existence of one of the above conditions, the
trustee is authorized to sell property free of dower or curtesy rights
of a spouse.1 "
c. Sale of Co-owned Property
Subsections (h), (i), and (j) of section 363 provide special rules
that apply to sales of property which the debtor co-owns with some
other party as a joint tenant, tenant in common, tenant by the en-
tirety, or as community property. Community property may be
sold free of a spouse's interest only in accordance with section
363(f), above. Any of the other types of co-owned property may be
sold free of the co-owner's interest only if all the following condi-
tions exist:
(1) partition is impracticable;
(2) sale of the estate's undivided interest would produce sig-
nificantly less for the estate than would sale of the property
free of the co-owner's interest;
(3) the benefit to the estate of sale free of the co-owner's in-
terest outweighs any detriment to the co-owner caused by such
sale; and
(4) the property is not used for commercial production, distri-
bution, or transmission of electricity or gas.
1 07
Before the sale of any of the above property to a prospective
buyer, the co-owner or spouse, as the case may be, is accorded the
right of first refusal to purchase the property at the agreed upon
price.108 After the sale, the trustee must pay to the co-owner or
105. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 363(f).
106. Id. § 363(g).
107. Id. § 363(h).
108. Id. § 363(i).
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spouse his or her allocable share of the proceeds.109
2. Forfeiture Clauses
It is not uncommon for a security agreement, lease agreement,
or other contract conveying an interest in property to restrict
transferability or to provide for automatic termination of an inter-
est upon the insolvency or bankruptcy of a debtor. Section 541(c)
of the Code provides that the debtor's interest in such property
becomes part of the estate notwithstanding such contractual limi-
tation. Section 363(1), however, renders ineffective against the trus-
tee who wishes to transfer estate property only those contract
clauses or substantive laws that automatically terminate a debtor's
interest in property in the event of bankruptcy, insolvency, or
financial condition.110 Contractual or statutory restrictions on
transfer of property remain effective as against the trustee and
may render estate property of no value to the estate.
3. Adequate Protection
Critical to any secured creditor or other party asserting an in-
terest in estate property that the trustee proposes to use, sell, or
lease, is some assurance that the party's interest will not be im-
paired through depreciation of the property. Protection of third
party interests is also important during the course of the section
362 automatic stay. Finally, section 364 provides the trustee with
the power to subordinate third party interests in return for an ex-
tension of credit. All the above actions would be inequitable unless
compensatory protection were provided the party whose interest in
property is threatened. To protect 1) the third party interest in
property to be used, sold, or leased by the trustee under section
363, 2) the third party who is stayed from collecting his claim from
property of the estate under section 362, and 3) the third party
whose interest is subordinated by the trustee in order to obtain
credit to operate the debtor's business, the Code accords such par-
ties the right to demand and receive adequate protection of their
interests."
109. Id. § 363(j).
110. Id. § 361(1).
111. Id. §§ 362(d), 363(e), and 364(d)(1). Under § 363(e), property subject to a third
party interest may not be used, leased, or sold over the objection of the party unless ade-
quate protection is provided. A creditor's interest may be subordinated under § 364(d)(1)
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Section 361 describes three ways in which a secured party's or
co-owner's interest may be adequately protected when placed in
jeopardy under sections 362, 363, or 364.112 First, adequate protec-
tion may be provided by requiring the trustee to make periodic
cash payments to the party to the extent of the decrease in value
of the party's interest in the property.118 The second method of
providing adequate protection is to provide the secured party or
co-owner with an additional or compensatory lien in other prop-
erty to the extent of the decrease in value of the party's interest.
1 1 '
only if he is provided adequate protection. Finally, relief from the § 362 automatic stay
must be granted unless there is adequate protection of a stayed party's interest in estate
property.
112. The House Judiciary Committee comments indicate that the concept of "ade-
quate protection" is designed to provide flexibility for the trustee in dealing with the estate
while at the same time assure the secured creditor of the value of his bargain:
Secured creditors should not be deprived of the benefit of their bargain.
There may be situations in bankruptcy where giving a secured creditor an abso-
lute right to his bargain may be impossible or seriously detrimental to the bank-
ruptcy laws. Thus, this section recognizes the availability of alternate means of
protecting a secured creditor's interest. Though the creditor might not receive his
bargain in kind, the purpose of the section is to insure that the secured creditor
receives in value essentially what he bargained for.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 18, at 339.
113. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 363(1). The term "value" is not defined by the Code,
nor are any guidelines given courts for evaluating depreciation. Rather, courts are given
discretion to value the benefit of the secured party's bargain on a case-by-case basis:
The section specifies four means of providing adequate protection. They are
neither exclusive nor exhaustive. They all rely, however, on the value of the pro-
tected entity's interest in the property involved. The section does not specify how
value is to be determined, nor does it specify when it is to be determined. These
matters are left to case-by-case interpretation and development. It is expected
that the courts will apply the concept in light of facts of each case and general
equitable principles. It is not intend'ed that the courts will develop a hard and fast
rule that will apply in every case. The time and method of valuation is not speci-
fied precisely, in order to avoid that result. There are an infinite number of varia-
tions possible in dealings between debtors and creditors, the law is continually
developing, and new ideas are continually being implemented in this field. The
flexibility is important to permit the courts to adapt to varying circumstances and
changing modes of financing.
Neither is it expected that the courts will construe the term value to mean, in
every case, forced sale liquidation value or full going concern value. There is wide
latitude between those two extremes. In any particular case, especially a reor-
ganizaton case, the determination of which entity should be entitled to the differ-
ence between the going concern value and the liquidation value must be based on
equitable considerations based on the facts of the case. It will frequently be based
on negotiation between the parties. Only if they cannot agree will the court be-
come involved.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 18, at 339.
114. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 361(2).
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The final form of adequate protection, phrased rather open-en-
dedly, provides the trustee and court with discretion to formulate
other types of protection (other than granting the claim priority as
an administrative expense) that will assure the party of realizing
the "indubitable equivalent" of its interest in estate property.11
4. Securing Credit
In cases where the trustee is authorized under section 721 to
wind up a business during liquidation or to operate the debtor's
business during rehabilitation under sections 1108 or 1304, it will
generally be critical that the trustee be able to obtain loans and
credit. Inability to do so will likely result in inefficient liquidation
or frustrate effective rehabilitation. To increase the chances of se-
curing such credit on behalf of an entity that by definition is a
poor credit risk, section 364 of the Code grants the trustee the
115. Id. § 361(3). H.R. 8200 originally proposed that, in addition to providing the se-
cured party with periodic cash payments or a compensatory lien, adequate protection could
be afforded by granting the secured party an administrative expense claim or by "granting
such other relief as will result in the realization by such entity of the value of such entity's
interest in such property." H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 361 (1977). As finally enacted,
authorization to grant the secured party an administrative expense claim was deleted and
the final section was reworded to define value in terms of the "indubitable equivalent" of a
secured party's interest in estate property. Representative Don Edwards explained the rea-
sons for the change as follows:
Section 361 of the House amendment represents a compromise between H.R.
8200 as passed by the House and the Senate amendment regarding the issue of
"adequate protection" of a secured party. The House amendment deletes the pro-
vision found in section 361(3) of H.R. 8200 as passed by the House. It would have
permitted adequate protection to be provided by giving the secured party an ad-
ministrative expense regarding any decrease in the value of such party's collateral.
In every case there is the uncertainty that the estate will have sufficient property
to pay administrative expenses in full.
Section 361(4) of H.R. 8200 as passed by the House is modified in section
361(3) of the House amendment to indicate that the court may grant other forms
of adequate protection, other than an administrative expense, which will result in
the realization by the secured creditor of the indubitable equivalent of the credi-
tor's interest in property. In the special instance where there is a reserve fund
maintained under the security agreement, such as in the typical bondholder case,
indubitable equivalent means that the bondholders would be entitled to be pro-
tected as to the reserve fund, in addition to the regular payments needed to ser-
vice the debt. Adequate protection of an interest of an entity in property is in-
tended to protect a creditor's allowed secured claim. To the extent the protection
proves to be inadequate after the fact, the creditor is entitled to a first priority
administrative expense under section 507(b),
124 CONG. Rc. H11092 (Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Representative Edwards).
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power to provide incentives to a prospective lender.1" Section
364(a) permits the trustee, unless the court rules otherwise, to in-
cur unsecured debt in the ordinary course of the business he is
operating"' by according such creditor's claim the status of a sec-
tion 503(b)(1) administrative expense, entitled to first priority of
payment under section 507(a)(1). The trustee may likewise obtain
unsecured credit not in the ordinary course of business (if needed
for liquidation or winding up a business, or an unusually large loan
in a rehabilitation case) as an administrative expense, but only af-
ter notice to interested parties and an opportunity for a hearing. 8
Subsection (c) of section 364 authorizes other means of en-
couraging loans which may only be used if the trustee is unable to
obtain a loan as an administrative expense and which the court
must approve after notice and opportunity for a hearing. These al-
ternatives are 1) granting the loan priority over administrative ex-
penses, 2) giving the lender a lien or security interest in unencum-
bered estate property, or 3) securing the loan as a junior lien or
security interest in encumbered estate property. If credit still can-
not be obtained by any of the above methods, the trustee may se-
cure the loan with a first lien on encumbered estate property pro-
vided the subordinated lienholder is given adequate protection as
defined by section 361 and the court authorizes the action after
notice and opportunity to be heard.119
5. Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases
As was the case under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act,120 section 365
of the Code authorizes the trustee, subject to court approval and
with certain exceptions and limitations, to assume, assign, or reject
executory contracts and unexpired leases. 2' The Code does not de-
fine an executory contract, but the House Judiciary Committee Re-
port indicates that a contract is executory if some performance re-
mains due by both parties.1'2 If one party has completed
116. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 364.
117. The court's authority to appoint a trustee to operate a debtor's business is found
in § 721 (liquidation), § 1108 (business reorganization), and § 1304 (individual rehabilita-
tion) of the Code.
118. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 364(b).
119. Id. § 364(d).
120. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70c.
121. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 365.
122. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 18, at 347.
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performance, the contract is not executory. Section 365 applies to
all proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code except to the extent
that sections 765 and 766 provide for different rules in commodity
stockbroker liquidations. Subsections (b), (c), and (d) of section
365 set out the principal limitations on the trustee's power of as-
sumption or rejection.
Section 365(b)(1) protects the other party to an executory con-
tract under which a debtor is in default. Before the trustee may
assume or assign the contract (and thus enforce performance), he
must cure the default (or provide assurance of a prompt cure), pro-
vide adequate assurance of future performance, and compensate
(or provide assurance of prompt compensation) any party who has
suffered pecuniary loss caused by such default.'"3 Section 365(b)(2)
relieves the trustee from the above requirements if default arose
out of a contractual provision defining breach as the debtor's insol-
vency or financial condition, the initiation by or against the debtor
of a bankruptcy proceeding, or the appointment of a trustee or
custodian to take possession of the debtor's property. In other
words, a trustee need not cure a breach of a so-called ipso facto
bankruptcy clause as a condition of assuming or assigning the con-
tract. Subsection (3) of section 365(b) provides specific assurances
that must be given a landlord before the trustee will be permitted
to assume a shopping center lease.
124
Unless the other party to the contract consents to the assump-
tion or assignment, the trustee may assume or assign performance
of an executory contract only where applicable nonbankruptcy law
would require the other party to accept such performance.1 25 Fur-
123. While § 365(b)(1) imposes these duties upon the trustee only as conditions prece-
dent to assumption, that they must also be complied with prior to an assignment is made
clear by § 365(0(2) which requires that a contract or lease be assumed by the trustee before
it may be assigned.
124. Section 365(b)(3) provides:
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this section, adequate assurance of fu-
ture performance of a lease of real property in a shopping center includes ade-
quate assurance-
(A) of the source of rent and other consideration due under such lease;
(B) that any percentage rent due under such lease will not decline
substantially;
(C) that assumption or assignment of such lease will not breach substan-
tially any provision, such as a radius, location, use, or master agreement relating
to such shopping center; and
(D) that assumption or assignment of such lease will not disrupt substan-
tially any tenant mix or balance in such shopping center.
125. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 365(c)(1).
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thermore, the trustee is specifically precluded from assigning or as-
suming a contract committing a lender to make a loan or extend
credit to or for the benefit of the debtor."" Certain other restric-
tions are placed on assignments of executory contracts and
unexpired leases by section 365(f). Notwithstanding any applicable
law or clause in a contract or lease restricting, conditioning, or
prohibiting assignment of the contract or lease, the trustee may
make such assignment but only if he first assumes the contract or
lease and provides adequate assurance of performance by the as-
signee.127 Any law or contractual provision that provides for auto-
matic termination or modification of a contract in the event of as-
signment is ineffective against the trustee."2s
Section 365(e)(1) substantially limits the enforceability against
the trustee of ipso facto bankruptcy clauses in contracts the trus-
tee wishes to assign 12-9a change over prior law.180 No executory
contract or unexpired lease may be terminated or modified after
the commencement of a case solely by reason of an applicable law
or contractual provision according such rights in the event of insol-
vency or financial condition of the debtor, the commencement of a
bankruptcy proceeding by or against the debtor, or the appoint-
ment of a receiver or custodian to take possession of the debtor's
property. However, subsection (2) of section 365(e) relieves the
other party from accepting the assignment or assumption if appli-
cable law excuses the party from accepting performance from, or
rendering performance to, any party other than the debtor. Sub-
section (e)(2) also relieves a lender from accepting an assignment
or assumption of its commitment to loan money or extend credit to
the debtor.
Section 365(d) provides time limits within which a trustee
must decide whether to assume or reject an executory contract or
unexpired lease. In a liquidation case, unless the court for cause
126. Id. § 365(c)(2).
127. Id. § 365(f)(2).
128. Id. § 365(f)(3).
129. Id. § 365(e)(1).
130. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70b. expressly sanctioned such claims:
A general covenant or condition in a lease that it shall not be assigned shall not be
construed to prevent the trustee from assuming the same at his election and sub-
sequently assigning the same; but an express covenant that an assignment by op-
eration of law or the bankruptcy of a specified party thereto or of either party




grants an extension, a contract or lease not assumed within sixty
days of the order for relief is deemed rejected.131 In a rehabilitation
case under chapter 9, 11, or 13 the trustee may make his election
any time before confirmation of the plan; however, in order to pro-
vide relief to parties in doubt as to their status under contracts
with the debtor, section 365(d)(2) allows such parties to request
the court to order an earlier time within which the trustee must
make an election.
Sections 365(h) and 365(i) provide special protection to lessees
of real property from a debtor-lessor,182 and executory contract
purchasers of real property from a debtor-seller."'3 Subsection
(h)(1) permits the lessee under a rejected lease to remain in pos-
session for the term of the lease and any enforceable extension
provided thereunder. If the lessor elects to remain in possession, he
may offset against rent any post-rejection damages suffered as the
result of the debtor's post-rejection nonperformance of any lease
obligation, but may not recover additional damages from the estate
should damages exceed rent.3 Subsection (i) grants a purchaser of
real estate from the debtor under an executory contract that the
trustee has rejected the right to refuse the rejection provided he
has taken possession at the time of rejection. In such case, the
trustee is relieved of all other contractual obligations other than
delivery of title. 3 5 The exclusive remedy of the buyer for post-re-
jection damages is by way of offset against payments due under the
contract.' 83 If the purchaser is not in possession, or elects to accept
the rejection, he is accorded a lien against the debtor's interest in
the property for the amount of the purchase price already paid.
3 7
As under prior law, rejection of an executory contract or
unexpired lease constitutes a breach of the contract under section
365(g) and gives rise to a general unsecured claim against the es-
tate.138 A breach after an assumption by the trustee would give rise
to an administrative expense claim;139 the estate is not liable for
131. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 365(d)(1).
132. Id. § 365(h).
133. Id. § 365(i).
134. Id. § 365(h)(2).
135. Id. § 365(i)(2)(B).
136. Id. § 365(i)(2)(A).
137. Id. § 365(j).
138. Id. § 365(g).
139. Such claim for damages against the trustee would constitute an expense of pre-
serving the estate under § 503(b)(1)(A).
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any breach occurring after an assignment. " " While the time of
breach will generally be immediately before the filing of the peti-
tion, section 365(g)(2) specifies different times in cases converted
from one chapter to another.
6. Utility Service
A business debtor against whom a petition is filed, or a trustee
(or debtor in possession) charged with running the debtor's busi-
ness is particularly dependent upon suppliers of utilities who typi-
cally hold a monopoly and who consequently possess considerable
leverage to force payment of past due bills. The cutting off of utili-
ties is likely to either result in inefficient liquidation or an aborted
rehabilitation. Section 366, having no counterpart under prior law,
attempts to cut away some of this leverage by restricting the right
to cut off service because of unpaid pre-petition debts.14 Section
366(a) broadly prohibits utilities from altering, refusing, or discon-
tinuing service to, or discriminating against, the debtor or trustee
solely because bills for prebankruptcy service were not timely paid.
The prohibition is conditional under subsection (b) upon the trus-
tee providing, within twenty days of the order for relief, adequate
assurance that post-bankruptcy bills will be paid. The Code specif-
ically permits assurance in the form of a security deposit;14 2 the
House Judiciary Committee comments include allowance of the
claim as an administrative expense as an alternative form of
security.14 3
Trustee's Avoidance Powers
At the heart of bankruptcy law is the policy of assuring fair
and equitable distribution of the debtor's estate among creditors.
While for the most part, rights of the debtor and creditors are
fixed as of the day the petition is filed, principles of fairness and
equity demand that a trustee have ample power to upset actions of
the debtor or creditors that occurred before the filing of the peti-
tion and which, if left undisturbed, would have the effect of un-
140. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 365(k). The other party to the contract is protected
by § 365(f)(2)(B) which requires the trustee to provide adequate assurance of future per-
formance by the assignee as a condition precedent to assignment.
141. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 366.
142. Id. § 366(b).
143. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 18, at 350.
19801
UALR LAW JOURNAL
fairly depleting the estate to the advantage of some creditors and
the disadvantage of others. To this end, the Bankruptcy Code car-
ries over largely intact the trustee's avoidance powers under the
1898 Act to recover the debtor's fraudulent and preferential trans-
fers (including acquisition of judicial liens), and defeat the secured
status of certain creditors who are unperfected on the day of bank-
ruptcy or who acquire their interests in certain ways within pre-
scribed periods of time before bankruptcy. The most substantial
change over old law is the revision in the law of preference which
simplifies the trustee's burden of proof and specifically removes
from the definition of a preference certain transactions which are
not intended as credit transactions.
1. Hypothetical Lien Creditor Status
Perhaps the most powerful weapon possessed by the trustee
under the 1898 Act was his section 70c. status, on the day the peti-
tion was filed, of a lien creditor against all the debtor's property.
14 '
This power, used principally to defeat secured parties whose inter-
ests remained unperfected or otherwise vulnerable to a lien credi-
tor on the day of bankruptcy,14 5 is continued under section 544(a)
of the Code." 6 The trustee is accorded, on the day of bankruptcy,
all the rights and powers of 1) a creditor who obtains a judicial lien
(e.g., judgment lien, execution lien, garnishment lien)" 7 on all the
debtor's property, 2) a creditor who has a writ of execution re-
turned unsatisfied as against the debtor or 3) a bona fide purchaser
of the debtor's real property. This last power is new under the
Code and allows the trustee to prevail over secured creditors whose
vulnerability under state law is measured against intervening bona
fide purchasers rather than lien creditors (e.g., unrecorded statu-
144. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70c. provided in relevant part:
The trustee shall have as of the date of bankruptcy the rights and powers of:
(1) a creditor who obtained a judgment against the bankrupt upon the date of
bankruptcy, whether or not such a creditor exists, (2) a creditor who upon the
date of bankruptcy obtained a writ of execution returned unsatisfied against the
bankrupt, whether or not such a creditor exists, and (3) a creditor who upon the
date of bankruptcy obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings upon all
property, whether or not coming into possession or control of the court, upon
which a creditor of the bankrupt upon a simple contract could have obtained such
a lien, whether or not such a creditor exists.
145. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b). (1978 version).
146. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 544(a).
147. The Code defines "judicial lien" to mean a "lien obtained by judgment, levy, se-
questration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding." Id. § 101(27).
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tory liens and other real property interests).
2. Transfers Voidable Under Nonbankruptcy Law
Under section 544(b) of the Code, as under section 70c. of the
1898 Act, the trustee is subrogated to the avoidance rights of any
existing unsecured creditor with an allowable claim as to whom a
transfer by the debtor of any interest in the debtor's property is
voidable. 14 8 Thus, the trustee may use any federal or state law ren-
dering transfers voidable as to a creditor to bring property back
into the estate.14 The trustee's avoidance power under section
544(b), however, is greater than that of the creditor from whom it
is acquired. Since the trustee is viewed as representing the claims
of all general creditors, the measure of the avoidance would be the
amount of those claims. Thus, the Moore v. Bay doctrine is fol-
lowed 50 and the trustee may still defeat in toto a transfer of
$100,000 to a creditor as to whom it is voidable only as against one
unsecured creditor with a relatively small claim. While the applica-
tions of section 544(b) are many and varied, limited only by the
number of state and federal laws creating creditor avoidance pow-
ers, a principal importance is to continue to bring state fraudulent
conveyance law within the compass of the Bankruptcy Code.
3. Avoidance of Statutory Liens
Section 545 of the Code makes four types of statutory liens'51
(defined by section 101(38) to exclude judicial liens, 52 e.g., liens of
judgments, executions, or garnishments, etc.) against property of
the debtor voidable by the trustee:
(1) Any statutory lien which arises when a bankruptcy peti-
148. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 544(b).
149. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 6-104 (1978 version) (bulk transfers) and ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
68-1301-1309 (1967) (fraudulent conveyances).
150. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 18 at 370. The Moore v. Bay doctrine is
discussed at note 12, supra.
151. "Statutory lien" is defined by § 101(38) of the Bankruptcy Code as follows:
• . . lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or condi-
tions, or lien of distress for rent, whether or not statutory, but does not include
security interest or judicial lien, whether or not such interest or lien is provided by
or is dependent on a statute and whether or not such interest or lien is made fully
effective by statute. . ..
Id. § 101(38).
152. "Judicial lien" is defined by the Code to mean any "lien obtained by judgment,
levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceedings." Id. § 101(27).
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tion is filed, when other insolvency proceedings are commenced
against the debtor, when an assignee for benefit of creditors,
receiver, or other custodian takes possession of the debtor's
property, when the debtor becomes insolvent or his financial
condition fails to meet a certain standard, or when certain
third party executions are levied against the debtor.
(2) Any lien not enforceable on the day of bankruptcy as
against a bona fide purchaser of the property.
(3) Any statutory lien for rent.
(4) Any statutory lien of distress for rent.153
Judicial liens, formerly void per se under section 67a.(1) of the
1898 Act if acquired within four months of bankruptcy while the
debtor was insolvent, will have to be dealt with as preferences
under section 547 of the new Code.
4. Fraudulent Transfers
Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code continues the trustee's
power to set aside fraudulent transfers of the debtor.'5 Under sec-
tion 548(a), the trustee may avoid any transfer of the debtor's
property or obligation incurred by the debtor if made or incurred
within one year of bankruptcy with actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud creditors. This represents no change over old law. 15 5 Ad-
ditionally, the trustee may set aside certain constructively fraudu-
lent transfers made within one year of bankruptcy. If the debtor
"received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange' 156
for a transfer, the trustee may set it aside if one of the following
three conditions exists:
(1) The debtor was insolvent when the transfer was made or
obligation incurred, or become insolvent as the result of the
transfer or obligation.'5 7 Insolvency is defined by section
101(26) as a financial condition such that the sum of the
debtor's property, excluding exempt property and property
conveyed with actual intent to delay, hinder, or defraud credi-
tors, valued at fair valuation (as opposed to the liquidation val-
uation required under old section 67d.(1)) would be insufficient
153. Id. § 545.
154. Id. § 548.
155. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 67d.(2)(d).
156. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 548(a)(2)(A).
157. Id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i).
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to pay existing debts.
(2) Regardless of the debtor's solvency, the debtor was en-
gaged or about to engage in a business or a transaction for
which the amount of property remaining after the transfer was
an unreasonably small capital.'
(3) Regardless of the debtor's solvency, the debtor believed he
would incur or intended to incur debts that would be beyond
his ability to pay as they matured.'59
Aside from the new definition of insolvency noted above, sec-
tion 548 embodies two other substantial changes over old law.
First, the requirement of section 67d.(1)(e) that constructively
fraudulent transfers not have been made in good faith is deleted.
Second, section 548 deletes the old section 67d.(3) type of fraudu-
lent transfer. Transfers made in contemplation of bankruptcy or
liquidation for the purpose of obtaining funds with which to make
a preferential transfer will no longer be fraudulent provided they
are made while solvent for reasonably equivalent value.
The time a transfer is made, for purposes of beginning the
one-year statute of limitations, is measured under section 548(d)
from the day that the transferor-debtor could no longer convey to
a bona fide purchaser as to defeat or subordinate the interest of
the transferee. This is important in cases where a filing is required
to protect the transferee's interest against third parties (e.g., real
estate conveyances, mortgages, security interests). In such cases,
delayed perfection occurring within one year of bankruptcy may
bring within the trustee's avoidance powers transfers nominally
outside of the one-year period.16 0 If the applicable steps for perfec-
tion have not been taken on the day of bankruptcy, the transfer is
deemed made immediately prior to the filing of the petition. 6"
Section 548(c) protects the good faith purchaser for value who
loses property to the trustee under section 548(a). Unless the
transfer is also voidable for some reason other than its being fraud-
ulent, the transferee is entitled to a return of his consideration and
158. Id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii).
159. Id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(iii).
160. For example, assume that fourteen months before bankruptcy a debtor, with in-
tent to defraud creditors, executed a real estate deed to a third party. The third party re-
corded the deed three months later. While the actual transfer occurred more than a year
before bankruptcy, the delayed recording within 1 year before bankruptcy rendered the
transfer vulnerable under § 548.
161. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 548(d)(1).
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is accorded a lien on the property transferred to enforce
repayment.
Preferential Transfers
The most substantial change in trustee avoidance powers
brought about by the Bankruptcy Code involves the law of prefer-
ential transfers. While preferences were valid at common law,
bankruptcy law has long recognized that the policy of fair and eq-
uitable distribution or management of an insolvent estate would be
frustrated if a debtor were allowed to benefit certain creditors over
others in anticipation of bankruptcy, or if creditors with inside
knowledge of financial difficulty or who occupy positions of undue
leverage could use this knowledge or position to squeeze advantage
out of a debtor over and above that to which they would be enti-
tled in a bankruptcy liquidation or rehabilitation. To this end, the
1898 Act sought to undo (and thus discourage) the effects of the
creditors' scramble for advantage by making certain transfers for
preexisting debt, made while the debtor was insolvent and while
the creditor had knowledge of insolvency, conclusively unfair and
thus avoidable."' The new Bankruptcy Code continues this policy,
but with substantial modification designed to simplify the trustee's
burden, more closely conform to the Uniform Commercial Code,
and specifically remove from the definition of a preference certain
transfers which, though technically for antecedent debt, are really
intended by the parties to be contemporaneous with the creation
of debt. "
Section 547(b) of the Code defines a preference as any transfer
of property of the debtor-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor
before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of
the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the
filing of the petition, if such creditor, at the time of such
162. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 60.




(i) was an insider; and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was
insolvent at the time of such transfer; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor
would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under Chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the
extent provided by the provisions of this title.""
Additionally, subsection (f) of section 547 gives the trustee the
benefit of a presumption that the debtor was insolvent during the
ninety days before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The effect
of the presumption under Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence is to place on the transferee the burden of going forward
with sufficient evidence of solvency to withstand a motion for a
directed verdict. "5 Once this is done, the trustee must still carry
the ultimate burden of persuasion.
The above definition of a preferential transfer represents a
change over old section 60a.(1) in several respects. First, the period
of time before bankruptcy during which transfers for antecedent
debts will be vulnerable to later attack as preferences has been
shortened from four months to 90 days. On the other hand, trans-
fers to insiders of the debtor (certain persons specified in section
101(25) who have a particularly close business or personal relation-
ship to the debtor) remain vulnerable for one year. Second, to set
aside most preferences, the trustee will no longer have to prove the
irrelevant, often unprovable, but usually existing fact that the
transferee had reasonable cause to know of the debtor's insolvency
at the time the transfer was made. The trustee will, however, be
required to prove such reasonable cause with respect to insider
transfers made within 90-365 days of bankruptcy. The third major
definitional change involves the way in which transfer benefit to
the creditor is measured. Under prior law, the test was whether or
not the effect of the transfer was to give the transferee a greater
percentage of his debt than other members of the same class."6
This definition contained at least two loopholes. An otherwise pref-
164. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 547(b).
165. FED. R. EviD. 301; COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 18 at 375.
166. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 60a.(1).
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erential pro rata transfer to all creditors within a particular section
64 priority class would not be preferential even though the effect of
the transfer was to deplete the estate so that assets became insuffi-
cient to fully pay higher priority classes. 1 7 Second, payment to a
creditor whose claim would not have been allowed in bankruptcy
was preferential only to the extent it exceeded the percentage of
allowed claims paid other creditors of the same class in bank-
ruptcy. 168 The new Code replaces the comparative benefit test with
one that focuses simply upon whether the transfer had the effect of
improving the transferee's position over and above what a chapter
7 liquidation would have produced had the transfer not been
made.
Several of the general bankruptcy definitions found in section
101 of the Code are important to a thorough understanding of the
law of preferences. "Transfer" is defined in section 101(40) as
broadly as possible to include virtually every voluntary or involun-
tary disposition of an interest in property-including retention of
title as a security interest.'"6 Section 101(26) adopts a balance
sheet definition of insolvency as a financial condition where the ag-
gregate of the debtor's property, less exempt property and prop-
erty transferred with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud
creditors, is at fair valuation, insufficient to pay the debtor's
debts.17 0 "Insider" is a term new to bankruptcy. Section 101(25)
lists a number of classes of persons whose close relationship to the
debtor, either by affinity, consanquinity, or business, suggests that
167. For example, assume that shortly before bankruptcy a sole proprietor used all his
nonexempt assets to completely pay all past due taxes. Had the payment not been made,
sufficient assets would have fallen into the estate to fully pay administrative expenses and
employee wage claims. The payment of the tax claims would not have been preferential
since all members of the preferred class received 100% of their claims.
168. The payment would not have been considered preferential even though the effect
was to take property out of the estate that would otherwise have been available to creditors
because whether or not the preferred creditor's claim would have been allowed in bank-
ruptcy was irrelevant. So long as he received no greater percentage of his claim than those
in the same class, it mattered not that bankruptcy would have netted him nothing.
169. The code defines "transfer" as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or condi-
tional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest
in property, including retention of title as a security interest." Bankruptcy Code of 1978, §
101(40).
170. Id. § 101(26)(A). The definition of insolvency in § 101(26)(A) applies to all enti-
ties other than partnerships. For partnerships, the definition is modified by § 101(26)(B) "to
account for the liability of a general partner for the partnership's debts." COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 18, at 312.
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their transactions with the debtor be subjected to close scrutiny. 17 1
Subsection (c) of section 547 specifically exempts from the sec-
tion 547 avoidance power certain transactions, technically within
the definition of a preference, but which practically are not trans-
fers for antecedent consideration, which in no way frustrate equita-
ble distribution among creditors, and which in no way will en-
courage creditors to preditorily dismember a debtor prior to
bankruptcy. The first type of transfer excepted from the trustee's
section 547 avoidance power is one that is intended to be and in
fact is a contemporaneous exchange for new value.1 72 A cash sale
wherein payment is delayed for a short period of time falls within
the exception. Likewise, an intended credit transaction where there
is a slight delay in preparation of the security document would be
protected.
The second exception is for payment of debts within forty-five
days of creation in the ordinary course of the business or financial
affairs of the debtor and transferee.7 8 Where goods or services are
171. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 101(25):
"insider" includes-
(A) if the debtor is an individual-
(i) relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(ii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iii) general partner of the debtor; or
(iv) corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in
control;
(B) if the debtor is a corporation-
(i) director of the debtor;
(ii) officer of the debtor;
(iii) person in control of the debtor;
(iv) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) general partner of the debtor; or
(vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the
debtor;
(C) if the debtor is a partnership-
(i) general partner in the debtor;
(ii) relative of a general partner in, general partner of, or person in control
of the debtor;
(iii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iv) general partner of the debtor; or
(v) person in control of the debtor;
(D) if the debtor is a municipality, elected official of the debtor or relative of an
elected official of the debtor;
(E) affiliate, or insider of an affiliate as if such affiliate were the debtor; and
(F) managing agent of the debtor.
172. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 547(c)(1).
173. Id. § 547(c)(2). Both the incurring and payment of the debt must be in the ordi-
nary course of business or financial affairs of both the debtor and transferee.
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charged on an ordinary charge account, payment at the end of the
applicable billing period is technically a transfer for an antecedent
debt. Such ordinary-course-of-business payments, either by a con-
sumer or business debtor, are insulated from avoidance by the
trustee. The House Judiciary Committee comments indicate that
protection is also extended to taxing entities who receive payment
of taxes within forty-five days after the tax is last due without
penalty.
174
Under section 9-312(4) of the Uniform Commercial Code, a
purchase money secured party in collateral other than inventory is
given a ten-day grace period after the date the debtor receives pos-
session within which to file a financing statement and have the day
of perfection relate back to the date the debtor received posses-
sion.17 5 In cases where the seller finances the sale, the general ten-
day grace period provided by section 547(e) of the Bankruptcy
Code within which perfection may be had and the day of deemed
transfer (the day of perfection) relate back to the day the debt was
created would insulate the delayed perfection from being a transfer
for an antecedent debt.17 1 In the case of a lender who extends
funds to enable the debtor to purchase property, however, the
funds will generally be transferred (and the debt created) in ad-
vance of the debtor's taking possession. Since the general section
547(e) grace period would not protect the lender in the event the
period of time between the extension of the loan and an appropri-
ate Uniform Commercial Code filing exceeded ten days, such a
transfer is excepted under section 547(c) provided perfection is
had within ten days after the security interest attaches. 177
The fourth exception continues the so-called "net result rule"
174. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 18, at 373.
175. U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1978 version).
176. The rules for determining when the Bankruptcy Code deems transfers to have
been made are discussed at pp. 43-44 of the text, infra.
177. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 547(c)(3). Assume, for example, that Lender agreed
to finance Debtor's purchase of equipment from Seller. On 1/10/79, Debtor and Lender exe-
cute a security agreement and Lender advances Debtor $500.00. Debtor, however, does not
get around to purchasing the equipment from Seller until 1/20/79, and Lender files a financ-
ing statement on 1/25/79. Since the debt was created on 1/10 and the transfer occurred on
1/25, the transfer is for an antecedent debt. Furthermore, the transfer is not saved by the
10-day grace period of § 547(e)(2) which begins running on the day the transfer becomes
effective between the parties-here, 1/10/79. Section 547(c)(3) protects the above enabling
Lender by according a 10-day grace period for perfection measured from the time the secur-
ity interest attached-1/20. Thus, Lender had until 1/20 to file a financing statement and
not have such transfer be considered preferential.
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of section 60c. of the 1898 Act. To the extent a creditor and debtor
engage in a series of transactions during the ninety-day period
before bankruptcy, the creditor who gives new unsecured value to
the estate is entitled to offset such value against preferential pay-
ments received during the period. Section 547(c)(4) provides a
formula whereby a series of mutual transactions are netted out so
that only the net improvement of the creditor's position during the
period will be considered preferential.1
7 8
Inventory or accounts receivable financing contemplates a
mass of collateral, the component parts of which are constantly
changing. As inventory is sold, collateral is freed from the security
interest, but the interest attaches to proceeds when generated and
to new items of inventory when acquired. Technically, attachment
of the security interest to new items represents a transfer for an
antecedent debt but does not violate any of the policy considera-
tions concerning equity among creditors. A creditor receives no
benefit or improvement in secured position unless there is a net
gain in the value of the mass during the ninety days before bank-
ruptcy. Section 547(c)(5), the fifth exception, adopts this improve-
ment-in-position test and provides that a perfected security inter-
est in inventory, accounts receivable, or the proceeds of either, will
be preferential only to the extent that a creditor enjoys a net im-
provement in his secured position during the ninety-day period.
Improvement is measured by the net reduction in the amount by
which the debt exceeded the value of the security between the be-
ginning of the ninety-day period (or a later date, if credit was first
extended during the ninety-day period) and the day of bank-
ruptcy.17 ' The final exception, section 547(c)(6), makes it clear that
statutory liens which survive section 545 may not be defeated as
preferences. 80
178. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 547(c)(4). Assume that 90 days before bankruptcy
Debtor owes Creditor $1,000 in unsecured debt. Fifty days before bankruptcy Debtor makes
a $1,000 preferential transfer to Creditor. Thirty days before bankruptcy, Creditor makes a
$1,000 unsecured loan to Debtor. Section 547(c)(4) permits Creditor to offset the $1,000
unsecured transfer of new value to the estate against the $1,000 preferential transfer re-
ceived by the creditor. The "net result" of the two transfers was that the estate lost nothing
and the creditor did not improve his position or gain any advantage. Section 547(c)(4) would
not apply if the new value transferred were secured.
179. Id. § 547(c)(5). Cases such as DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1966)
and Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank and Savings Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.
1969) are overruled. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 18, at 374.
180. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 547(c)(6).
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Subsection (e) of section 547 establishes rules for determining
if the transfer was for an antecedent debt or within the requisite
period of time before bankruptcy. 181 With respect to real property
interests, a transfer is deemed made when the transferee has taken
all necessary steps to protect himself against a bona fide purchaser
of the property from the debtor-transferor (e.g., rendition or filing
of a judgment, filing of a lien, recording a mortgage or deed). With
respect to transfers of fixtures and other personal property inter-
ests, a transfer is deemed made when the transferee has taken
whatever action is necessary to protect himself against an interven-
ing lien creditor of the debtor-transferor. If the transfer is of title
to personalty, no further action is generally necessary and applica-
ble law respecting passage of title will determine time of transfer.
If the transfer is of a security interest or statutory lien, filing is
generally required for protection against intervening lien creditors
and the day of filing will generally be the day of transfer. Liens
which offer protection without filing will usually represent trans-
fers made at the time of attachment. 82 Section 547(e)(2) cured the
confusion inherent in section 60a.(7)I. of the 1898 Act' by grant-
ing a transferee a uniform ten-day grace period within which to
take all applicable steps necessary for protection against interven-
ing lien creditors or bona fide purchasers and have the day of
deemed transfer relate back to the day of actual transfer of the
property interest.184 As under prior law, if the steps required for
protection have not been taken on the day of the bankruptcy peti-
tion, the transfer will be considered to have been made immedi-
ately prior to the filing of the petition.
8 5
181. Id. § 547(e).
182. See, e.g., U.C.C. i 9-303(1) and § 9-302(1) (1978 version).
183. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 60a.(7)(I) provided:
I. Where (A) the applicable law specifies a stated period of time of
not more than twenty-one days after the transfer within which recording,
delivery, or some other act is required, and compliance therewith is had
within such stated period of time; or where (B) the applicable law specifies
no such stated period of time or where such stated period of time is more
than twenty-one days, and compliance therewith is had within twenty-one
days after the transfer, the transfer shall be deemed to be made or suffered
at the time of the transfer.
Confusion existed as to whether the 10-day grace period under § 9-312(4) shortened the
above 21-day grace period.
184. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 547(e)(2).
185. Id. § 547(e)(2)(C).
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Limitations of Trustee Avoidance Powers
Section 546 of the Code creates three important exceptions to
the trustee's avoidance powers.1 86 A statute of limitations, mea-
sured by the earlier of the closing of the case or two years from the
time a trustee is appointed, is imposed for bringing avoidance ac-
tions as a section 544(a) hypothetical lien creditor or section 544(b)
subrogee to creditor avoidance powers, or to set aside statutory
liens under section 545, fraudulent transfers under section 547,
preferential transfers under section 548, and setoffs under section
553. Subsection (b) of section 546 validates as against the trustee
generally applicable laws (such as section 9-301 or 9-312(4) of the
Uniform Commercial Code) that allow grace periods within which
perfection by a secured creditor may be made and intervening in-
terests defeated. Thus, for example, a purchase money secured
party whose interest attaches a few days before bankruptcy may
perfect within any applicable grace period and avoid a trustee's in-
tervening section 544(a) lien. The purpose of the limitation is to
prevent a surprise bankruptcy petition from frustrating a creditor's
good faith reliance on state law protection.' 87
.Finally, subsection (c) of section 546 is a response to the con-
fusion and conflicting court decisions concerning the applicability
in bankruptcy of a seller's common law or statutory reclamation
right against a buyer who receives goods while insolvent.'" The
trustee's avoidance powers under sections 544(a), 545, 547, and 549
are subject to such seller reclamation rights but only if the seller
makes a written demand within ten days of the buyer's receipt.
The court may nonetheless deny the reclamation, but must
award the seller compensatory protection in the form of a secured
or administrative expense claim. The major impact of this provi-
sion is to validate against the trustee, with some limitation, section
2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Setoff
Bankruptcy law has long recognized a creditor's right to offset
mutual debts between the debtor and the creditor on the theory
that it would be unfair to permit the trustee to collect in full from
186. Id. § 546.
187. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 18, at 371.
188. Id. at 372.
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the creditor, but to pay the creditor only a dividend.""9 Section 553
generally continues the right of setoff, but with certain exceptions
to prevent creditors from acquiring claims for the purpose of re-
ducing or eliminating the amount that would otherwise be owed to
the estate. 9 '
Subject to obtaining relief from the section 362 automatic
stay, section 553(a) recognizes the right of a creditor to offset mu-
tual debts between the debtor and creditor that arose before the
commencement of the case. Subsection (a) also creates three ex-
ceptions. A creditor may not offset 1) a claim that would be disal-
lowed under section 502, 2) a claim that was acquired from some-
one other than the debtor either after the petition was filed or
within ninety days before the petition while the debtor was insol-
vent, or 3) a debt that was incurred by the creditor to the debtor
within ninety days before the petition, while the debtor was insol-
vent, and for the purpose of obtaining a right of setoff.'9 '
Section 533 also subjects setoff of certain prebankruptcy debts
to close scrutiny as to prevent them from being disguised prefer-
ences. To the extent that a creditor's exercise of a right of setoff
during the ninety-day period before bankruptcy improves his posi-
tion vis-a-vis the estate (i.e., reduces his claim against the estate
below what it would have been had the right of setoff been exer-
cised more than ninety days before bankruptcy) the amount of the
reduction in net claim against the estate is recoverable by the trus-
tee from the creditor.192 Since after bankruptcy the amount of
setoff is not so limited, section 553(b) discourages creditors from
precipitating bankruptcy by exercising pre-petition setoff rights.
Automatic Preservation of Avoided Transfers
Under prior law, the bankruptcy court was authorized to pre-
serve avoided transfers if preservation would benefit the estate.' 9"
189. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 68.
190. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 553.
191. Since the practical effect of a setoff is payment in full of a part of the creditor's
claim (in the sense that the creditor need not pay his debt in full, then be forced to accept
only part payment of the debtor's debt), the last two exceptions are necessary to prevent the
acquisition of claims for purposes of effecting a setoff which would amount to a preferential
transfer.
192. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 553(b).
193. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 60b. (preferential transfers, § 67a.(3) (avoided liens), §




Section 551 changes prior law only to the extent that all avoided
transfers are automatically preserved.194 One effect of section 551
will be to automatically give the estate the benefit of all avoided
liens so as to prevent fortuitous elevation of junior lienholders
where senior interests in the same property are set aside.
Setting Aside Exempt Property
Prior to enactment of the new Bankruptcy Code, property
that was exempt from judicial process under state or nonbank-
ruptcy federal law never became a part of the bankruptcy estate
and was not subject to bankruptcy liquidation. 195 Section 522 of
the new Code creates, for the first time, a set of generous bank-
ruptcy exemptions available to an individual debtor unless a par-
ticular state, by legislation, restricts debtors within the state to ex-
isting nonbankruptcy exemptions."6e Unless and until a state so
legislates, a debtor may elect under section 522(b)(1) between ap-
plicable nonbankruptcy exemptions and those available under sec-
tion 522. A debtor is prohibited from choosing exemptions from
both sets. Section 522(m) provides that the exemptions section ap-
plies separately with respect to each debtor in a joint case. This
means that joint debtors may cumulate exemptions under section
522 or nonbankruptcy law, or that one may elect section 522 ex-
emptions and the other may choose those available under nonban-
kruptcy law.
Section 522 exempts the following property from the estate:'7
(1) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $7,500, in real or per-
sonal property used as a dwelling by the debtor or his
dependent.
(2) Up to $1,200 of the debtor's interest in one motor vehicle.
(3) The debtor's interest, limited to $200, in any single item
in all household goods of the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor.
(4) The debtor's aggregate interest in up to $500 worth of
jewelry held for personal use (as opposed to investment) of the
debtor or a dependent.
194. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 551.
195. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70a. The trustee acquired title only to the debtor's
nonexempt property. Exempt property never became a part of the estate.
196. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 522(b).
197. Id. § 522(d).
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(5) The debtor's aggregate interest not to exceed $400, plus
the amount of any unused homestead exemption, in any
property.
(6) The debtor's aggregate interest in up to $750 in tools of
the trade of the debtor or a dependent.
(7) Any unmatured life insurance contract (except a credit
life policy) owned by the debtor.
(8) Up to $4,000 in accrued dividends, loan value, or interest
of a life insurance policy under which the insured is either the
debtor or a person as to whom the debtor is a dependent.
(9) Professionally prescribed health aids of the debtor or a
dependent.
(10) The debtor's right to receive pension, social security, un-
employment compensation, local public assistance, veteran's
benefits, disability or illness benefits, and alimony, support, or
maintenance to the extent necessary for support of the debtor
and dependents.
(11) The debtor's right to receive, or property traceable to, a
crime victim's reparation award, wrongful death payments on
account of the death of one upon whom the debtor was depen-
dent to the extent reasonably necessary for support, proceeds
of a life insurance policy on the life of one as to whom the
debtor was dependent to the extent reasonably necessary for
support, payments not to exceed $7,500 for personal bodily in-
jury (excluding amounts for pain, suffering, or pecuniary loss),
and payment in compensation for loss of future earnings of the
debtor or one as to whom the debtor is dependent to the extent
necessary for support.
Section 522(l) requires that a debtor wishing to claim exemp-
tions file an inventory of property claimed as exempt. A dependent
of the debtor may file the inventory on behalf of the debtor if the
debtor neglects to do so. Creditors are then notified. Property
claimed as exempt will be set aside to the debtor unless a creditor
or the trustee objects. Property so exempted may not be subjected
to general creditor claims except for alimony, support, mainte-
nance, and taxes, but may be subjected to claims of secured credi-
tors whose liens are not voided by the Code.' 98
To fully protect a debtor's exemptions and assure a fresh
198. Id. § 522(c).
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start, section 522(e) provides that a waiver of exemptions executed
in favor of an unsecured creditor is unenforceable.199 Additionally,
a debtor may avoid any judicial lien on any exempt property and
all nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interests in most
exempt consumer goods, all tools of the trade, and prescribed
health aids to the extent that the value of an exemption would
otherwise be impaired.200 This may be done notwithstanding a
waiver of exemption executed in favor of such creditor. With the
above qualifications regarding a debtor's right to avoid certain
liens and security interests in exempt property, exemptions mea-
sured by "the debtor's interest" are available only to the extent
that the debtor has equity in the property claimed as exempt.
Proof and Allowance of Claims
The Bankruptcy Code follows traditional classification of
claims as either secured or general. Secured creditors whose se-
cured status is invulnerable as against the trustee will be allowed
either to remove their collateral from the estate or will receive pay-
ment of their claims for the full amount of the value of the secur-
ity. After exempt property has been set aside to the debtor and
fully-encumbered collateral abandoned to secured parties, the re-
maining estate is liquidated and proceeds paid to creditors with
secured claims that have not yet been satisfied and to general cred-
itors whose claims have been allowed. As under the 1898 Act, but
with substantial changes, six classes of general claims are entitled
to priority of payment. 01 Claims within each priority class must be
fully satisfied within applicable maximum amounts before pay-
ment is made to the next lower priority class, and all priority
claims must be paid before dividends are paid on general claims
not entitled to priority.2
0
2
To assure participation in liquidation of the estate, a creditor
is required by section 501 to file a proof of claim.208 A proof of
claim under currently applicable rules204 lists the name of the cred-
itor, the amount of money allegedly owed by the debtor, the con-
199. Id. § 522(e).
200. Id. 8 522(0.
201. Id. 8 507(a).
202. Id. 88 507(a) and 726(a).
203. Id. § 501.




sideration for the claim, whether or not the claim has been reduced
to judgment, any setoff or counterclaim to which the claim is sub-
ject, a statement that all payments on the claim have been prop-
erly credited, and whether the claim is secured, general, or entitled
to priority. If the claim is secured, the creditor must describe the
property claimed or held as collateral and attach a copy of the se-
curity agreement. If the claim is founded upon a writing, a copy of
the writing must be attached if available. Subsections (b) and (c)
of section 501 provide that the trustee, debtor, or co-obligor on a
claim may file a proof of claim if one is not timely filed by the
creditor. While generally only pre-petition debts may be treated in
bankruptcy, the Code recognizes exceptions for claims arising be-
tween the filing of an involuntary petition and subsequent order
for relief which, for purposes of filing proofs of claims, are treated
by subsection (d) as though they were pre-petition debts.
The term "claim" is defined broadly in section 101(4) to in-
clude any "right to payment," whether or not reduced to judg-
ment, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, matured or
unmatured, disputed or undisputed, secured or unsecured.2 0 5 The
breadth of the term is designed to provide the bankruptcy court
with power to deal with all legal obligations of the debtor no mat-
ter how remote or contingent they might be.206 For example, liabil-
ity of the debtor under an unliquidated, contingent, and unfiled
cause of action in tort could be decided by the bankruptcy court,
the amount of damages liquidated and paid as a dividend, and a
discharge granted.
Once a proof of claim is filed, section 502(a) provides that it
automatically be allowed unless some interested party (generally
the trustee, debtor, or a creditor) objects.01 Since the concept of
provability has been abolished under the Code, section 502(b) con-
tains the exclusive list of those types of debts which will not be
205. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 101(4) defines "claim" as follows:
(4) "Claim" means-
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judg-
ment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured or;
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such
breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an
equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured[.]
206. COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, supra note 18, at 309.
207. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 502(a).
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allowed over the objection of an interested party, but which none-
theless will be discharged unless specifically excepted by section
523 or unless the debtor has committed an act described in section
727 which would bar discharge of all debts. Claims which may be
disallowed are as follows:
20 8
(1) A claim that is unenforceable against the debtor for a rea-
son other than that it is contingent or unmatured. (An inter-
ested party may assert any defenses the debtor could assert
against any creditor, e.g., usury, statute of limitations, uncon-
scionability, or failure of consideration, etc.)
(2) Any claim for interest that has not yet been earned as of
the date of bankruptcy.
(3) That portion of a claim which may be offset under section
553 against a claim of the debtor against the creditor.
(4) Any tax assessed against property of the estate to the ex-
tent it exceeds the estate's interest in the property.
(5) A claim for the services of an insider of the debtor or the
debtor's attorney to the extent it exceeds the reasonable value
of the services.
(6) Claims for unmatured alimony, maintenance, or child sup-
port. (Since such claims are excepted from discharge by section
523(a)(5), they will be paid out of the debtor's post-petition
earnings.)
(7) A landlord's claim for damages due to a breach of a long-
term lease is limited to the greater of (a) one year's rent or (b)
rent for 15% of the remaining term not to exceed three years
rent. (This does not affect the landlord's claim for delinquent
rent.)
(8) An employee's claim for damages due to breach of an em-
ployment contract is limited to one year's salary. (This does
not affect any separate claim of the employee for unpaid salary
due as of the date of bankruptcy.)
(9) A federal tax claim which arises due to late payment of a
state unemployment insurance tax.
In addition to the above, section 502(d) follows prior law in
providing for the disallowance in toto of the claim of any creditor
who fails to turn over to the trustee property or money held under
a transfer avoided by the trustee. Section 502(c) requires that all
208. Id. § 502(b).
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claims be reduced to a dollar amount. If liquidation of a claim
would unduly delay the closing of the estate, the court must esti-
mate the amount for purposes of allowance.
Secured Creditors and Secured Claims
While the Bankruptcy Code is full of risks and perils for the
creditor contending to be secured in his claim, and much of the
trustee's avoidance power is designed to defeat secured claims, the
secured creditor who has planned carefully will emerge from bank-
ruptcy unscathed. Counterbalanced against the myriad of trustee
avoidance powers are the numerous other provisions designed to
protect the integrity of secured claims." 9
The Bankruptcy Code avoids the use of the ambiguous term
"secured creditor," recognizing that the term is essentially mean-
ingless unless the value of collateral is also known. Focus is instead
placed on the concept of "claim." For purposes of claim classifica-
tion, section 506 of the Code divides the claim of an undersecured
creditor into two parts.210 First, such creditor has a secured claim
that is measured in amount by the value of the collateral held by
the estate. The Code does not define value; the House Judiciary
Committee Report indicates that the court will have considerable
discretion in valuing collateral:
"Value" does not necessarily contemplate forced sale or liquida-
tion value of the collateral; nor does it always imply a full going
concern value. Courts will have to determine value on a case-by-
case basis, taking into account the facts of each case and the com-
peting interests in the case."1
As previously noted, section 541 provides that only property in
which the debtor has an interest becomes property of the estate.21 2
In the case of a secured claim, only the debtor's equity in the col-
lateral becomes estate property. If the debtor has no equity, only
his possessory interest becomes estate property. If the debtor is
not in possession of the collateral on the day of bankruptcy, the
secured party must turn over the property to the trustee if the se-
cured party's possession is successfully avoided or if the debtor re-
209. E.g., § 361 and §§ 363-65 of the Code condition exercise of much of the trustee's
administrative powers upon his assuring that secured parties are adequately protected.
210. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 506(a).
211. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 18, at 356.
212. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 541(a).
[Vol. 3:13
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
tains an interest in the property which is of value or benefit to the
estate. In most cases, however, property in which a secured party
(or co-owner) has an interest will be in possession of the trustee.
The secured party will need to take action to recover possession of
the property and foreclose on his interests or take steps to protect
that interest should the trustee elect to use, sell, or lease the prop-
erty under section 363. The Bankruptcy Code offers several ave-
nues of relief to the creditor with a secured claim.
Since the section 362 automatic stay operates to enjoin any
creditor action to collect a claim out of estate property, it is clear
that any self-help or judicial repossession and foreclosure remedy a
secured creditor had prior to bankruptcy is cut off upon the filing
of the petition. s1 The first avenue of relief available to the secured
creditor would be to obtain relief from the stay under section
362(d). If the security interest is inadequately protected or if the
debtor has no equity in collateral which is not needed for an effec-
tive reorganization, the court must terminate, annul, modify, or
condition the stay. 14
A second avenue of relief would be to persuade the trustee to
abandon the property to the secured creditor under section 554(a)
which gives the trustee discretion to abandon property which is
burdensome or of inconsequential value to the estate.2 1 5 Subsection
(b) of section 554 authorizes the court to order abandonment for
either of the above two reasons. Since a secured claim is measured
by the value of the collateral held as security, the recovery of col-
lateral from the estate will operate to extinguish the claim. The
creditor is free to keep or dispose of the property as he wishes; any
deficiency will be considered a general claim.
If the trustee is permitted under section 363 to use, sell, or
lease estate property in which a secured creditor has an interest,
the secured creditor is entitled to adequate protection against re-
duction in value of his security.21 For example, if collateral is sold,
the secured creditor may be given a lien in the proceeds; if prop-
erty is used by the estate, the creditor may be given periodic cash
payments as compensation for depreciation.1 Thus, the creditor
213. Id. § 362(a).
214. Id. § 362(d). The creditor could then pursue available nonbankruptcy remedies in
satisfaction of the secured claim.
215. Id. § 554(a).
216. Id. § 363(e).
217. Id. § 361.
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with an invulnerable secured claim who is not permitted to recover
possession of collateral is assured of ultimately recovering property
or cash, equivalent in value to the value of the collateral before
sale, use, or lease.
Further protection is given a secured claim in a liquidation
case. To the extent that the holder of a secured claim has neither
obtained relief from the automatic stay nor procured an abandon-
ment of the property, section 725 requires that before distribution
of the estate, the trustee dispose of any property that remains in
the estate and in which a party other than the estate has an inter-
est.218 The House Judiciary Committee Report indicates that the
section represents a final, flexible assurance that creditors who
have security interests or liens in estate property or proceeds are
paid the value of their claims before the estate is distributed to
holders of general claims.' 1'
Priority Claims
The Bankruptcy Code follows prior law in preferring certain
classes of general creditors in payment of claims. As under section
64a. of the 1898 Act, claims within each priority class must be fully
satisfied (up to a maximum dollar amount in the case of employee
compensation claims and certain consumer claims) to the exclusion
of payment on claims in the next lower priority classes, and prior-
ity claims must be paid before any dividends are paid to nonpri-
ority general creditors."0 Section 507 departs substantially from
old section 64a. in deleting the federal government (except in the
case of tax claims) as a creditor entitled to priority, expanding the
coverage and increasing the amount of a wage claim entitled to pri-
ority, and creating a new fifth priority for consumer down-pay-
ments deposited with debtors in connection with undelivered
goods and services." 1
The following priorities are created by section 507:
(1) First. Administrative expenses, (defined by section 503 to
include the costs of collecting, managing, preserving, and liqui-
dating the estate, the trustee's commission, certain taxes as-
sessed against the estate, certain creditor's expenses, and rea-
218. Id. § 725.
219. COMM. ON THE JuDIcRY, supra note 18, at 382-83.
220. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 507(a) and § 726(a).
221. Id. § 507(a).
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sonable costs for professional services rendered to the estate.
(2) Second. Unsecured claims which arise in the ordinary
course of a debtor's business between the filing of an involun-
tary petition and a subsequent order of relief.
(3) Third. Allowed unsecured claims for wages, salaries, or
commissions (including vacation, severance, and sick leave pay)
not to exceed $2,000 for each claimant (any deficiency becomes
a nonpriority general claim), earned within ninety days of the
earlier of the filing of the petition or the cessation of the
debtor's business.
(4) Fourth. Allowed unsecured claims for contributions to em-
ployee benefit plans (pension, insurance, etc.) arising from ser-
vices rendered within 180 days of the earlier of the filing of the
petition or the cessation of the debtor's business, limited in
amount for each plan to $2,000 times the number of covered
employees less the sum of all third priority wage payments and
all other priority benefit plan payments. The net effect of the
third and fourth priorities is to limit the total amount of all
employee priority claims to $2,000 times the number of em-
ployees with priority wage claims.
(5) Fifth. Claims by consumers, limited to $900 per claimant,
deposited as full or partial payment for the purchase or lease of
property or services, not provided or delivered, which were to
be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
(6) Sixth. The following tax claims owed to governmental
units:
a. Income or gross receipts taxes for which a return was
due within three years of the petition.
b. Property taxes assessed before the filing of the petition
and due without penalty within one year of the filing of the
petition.
c. Taxes such as a sales or use tax which the debtor is re-
quired to collect and for which he is liable.
d. Taxes on wages, salaries, or commissions (e.g., income
or social security) earned by the debtor's employees before
the filing of the petition for which a return is due within
three years before the petition.
e. Excise taxes on pre-petition transactions if a return was
due within three years of the petition, or if the transaction
occurred within three years of the petition if a return was
not required to be filed.
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f. Customs duties arising within one year before the
petition.
g. Penalties associated with the above claims only to the
extent they are compensation for actual pecuniary loss.
In a liquidation case, priority claims must be paid in full before
general nonpriority claims are paid.2 22 Section 507 will also have
importance in chapter 11 or 13 reorganization cases insofar as a
plan must provide for full payment of priority claims.23 Subsec-
tion (d) of section 507 makes it clear that a subrogee of a third,
fourth, fifth, or sixth priority claim is subrogated only to the right
to payment of the claim and not the priority.
General Nonpriority Claims
Section 726 of the Code sets out the order in which an estate
is to be distributed after secured and priority claims have been
paid.22 " General claims that are timely filed under section 501 or
tardily filed for good cause (such as lack of notice or knowledge of
the proceeding) are first paid. Although it is extremely rare for a
liquidation estate to have sufficient assets to pay more than a small
fraction of the above general claims, the Code is extremely opti-
mistic and provides for further priority of payment of remaining
assets. If money is left, unsecured claims tardily filed without
cause are next paid, followed by penalties (fines, tax penalties, pu-
nitive damages, etc.) which are not compensation for actual pecu-
niary loss, and finally, post-petition interest. In the case of a sol-
vent estate, any remaining assets are paid to the debtor.
Discharge
1. In General
A discharge of the debtor's debts is the primary objective of
nearly every voluntary bankruptcy and the vehicle through which
the law provides the debtor with a fresh financial start free of debt
collectors. The new Code continues the policy excepting certain
classes of debts from discharge (section 523), and denying a dis-
charge of debts in toto if the debtor is found to have committed
certain enumerated acts (section 727). The Code effects a substan-
222. Id. § 726(a).
223. Id. § 1129(a)(9) and § 1322(a)(2).
224. Id. § 726.
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tial change over prior law in that a discharge is only available to an
individual (corporations and partnerships are specifically excepted
by section 727(a)(1)) and an individual debtor engaged in business
may no longer be denied a discharge for making a false financial
statement in connection with a renewal or extension of credit. 2 5 In
addition, section 524 expands and broadens the effects of a dis-
charge over that contained in old section 14f., and section 525 codi-
fies case law which prohibits state and local governments from dis-
criminating against a person who has been the subject of a
bankruptcy proceeding.226
2. Denial of a Discharge
Section 727 of the Code directs the court to grant the debtor a
discharge in a liquidation case unless one of nine enumerated con-
ditions exists.2 27 The first ground for denying a discharge is that
the debtor is not an individual. Corporate and partnership debtors
are not entitled to a discharge. This represents a change over prior
law which is intended to "avoid trafficking in corporate shells and
in bankrupt partnerships.' ' 2 8 Other acts of the debtor which con-
stitute grounds for denying a discharge include 1) transferring
property with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors
within one year before bankruptcy, 2) fraudulently transferring or
concealing estate property after the filing of the petition, 3) failing
unjustifiably to keep, or concealing, destroying or falsifying books
and records from which the debtor's financial condition or business
transactions could be ascertained, 4) committing certain fraudulent
acts in connection with the particular bankruptcy proceeding, 5)
failing to explain any loss or deficiency of assets, 6) failing to obey
an order of the bankruptcy court or to respond to a question for a
reason other than the properly invoked privilege against self-in-
crimination, or 7) committing any of the above acts within one
year before the petition in another case involving an insider of the
debtor. As under prior law, a debtor will be denied a discharge if
225. Section 14c. of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act provided for denial of discharge in the
event such statement was made or published by a debtor engaged in business. Section 727 of
the Bankruptcy Code omits this ground. Section 523(a)(2) of the Code may, however, except
the particular debt from discharge provided the creditor reasonably relied on the statement
and the debtor made the statement with intent to deceive.
226. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
227. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 727(a).
228. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 18, at 384.
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one had previously been obtained in a liquidation case or corporate
reorganization case commenced within six years before the filing of
the petition.22 9 A discharge under a chapter 13 debt adjustment
plan obtained within six years of the petition will not bar a dis-
charge if under the plan 100% of the allowed unsecured claims
were paid or, alternatively, if 70% of such claims were paid, the
plan was entered in good faith, and compliance with the plan con-
stituted "the debtor's best effort."' 30 This represents a substantial
change over prior law which denied a discharge if a chapter 13 plan.
had merely been confirmed within the six years prior to the peti-
tion.23' Finally, a debtor may waive his right to discharge, but the
waiver must be in writing, must be executed after the order of re-
lief is entered, and must be approved by the court.'3 '
Subsection (b) of section 727 makes it clear that the discharge
relieves the debtor of liability for all debts not excepted from dis-
charge by section 523 regardless of whether or not a claim has been
filed or allowed. Subsection (c) authorizes the trustee or any credi-
tor to object to the discharge and gives the court power to order
the trustee to examine a debtor for purposes of determining
whether grounds for denying a discharge exist. The court is em-
powered to revoke a discharge within one year after it is granted if
the debtor committed certain fraudulent acts specified in subsec-
tion (d).
3. Debts Excepted From Discharge
Section 523(a) lists seven types of debts which are excepted
from the general discharge provisions of section 727 and for which
the debtor will remain liable after bankruptcy to the extent of any
deficiency remaining after distribution of the estate.?3 The follow-
ing debts are excepted from discharge:
(1) Taxes to the extent entitled to priority under section 507,
taxes for which a required return was not filed or tardily filed
within two years of the petition, and taxes for which the debtor
filed a fraudulent return or which he willfully attempted to
evade. This does not represent an appreciable change over
229. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 727(a)(8).
230. Id. § 727(a)(9).
231. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 14c.
232. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, § 727(a)(10).
233. Id. § 523(a).
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prior law. The tax claim will survive bankruptcy regardless of
whether it was filed or allowed.
(2) A claim for obtaining money, property, services, or credit
either through false representation or fraud other than a state-
ment respecting financial condition, or through the use of a
materially false written statement respecting the debtor's
financial condition upon which a creditor reasonably relied and
which was made with intent to deceive. To discourage abuse of
this section against consumer debtors, subsection (d) requires
the court to award costs and attorney's fees (unless to do so
would be inequitable) to any debtor against whom an unsuc-
cessful proceeding is brought to have a debt declared nondis-
chargeable for one of the above reasons.
(3) A claim which was not scheduled by the debtor so as to
facilitate timely filing by the creditor of a) a proof of claim or
b) an objection to discharge, of those debts which are dis-
charged unless objection is made. This exception is inapplica-
ble, however, as against a creditor who had actual knowledge of
the proceeding.
(4) A claim for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity, or a claim for embezzlement or larceny.
(5) A claim for support, alimony, or maintenance owed di-
rectly to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor. Sec-
tion 523(5) codifies case law under section 17a.(7) of the 1898
Act to the effect that obligations incorporated in property set-
tlements will be nondischargeable to the extent intended for
support.
(6) A claim for willful and malicious injury to the person or
property of another.
(7) A claim which is a fine or penalty owed to a governmental
unit and which is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.
Tax penalties associated with dischargeable taxes or with
transactions which occurred more than three years before
bankruptcy are discharged.
(8) A claim for an educational loan owed to a governmental
unit or a nonprofit institution of higher education unless the
loan first became due more than five years before bankruptcy
or excepting the debt from discharge would impose undue
hardship upon the debtor or his dependents. While this excep-
tion had no counterpart under section 17 of the 1898 Act, sec-
tion 439A of the Higher Education Act of 1965 made educa-
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tional loans owed to governmental units nondischargeable in
bankruptcy. Section 523 expands the coverage of section 493A
by making loans owed directly to an educational institution
also nondischargeable'
Subsection (c) of section 523 requires a creditor to initiate
proceedings in the bankruptcy court to have debts under subsec-
tion (a)(2) (obtaining credit fraudulently or on the basis of a false
financial statement), (a)(4) (fraud or defalcation as a fiduciary), or
(a)(6) (willful or malicious injury) excepted from discharge. "' If
the creditor fails to act, the debt is discharged.
4. Reaffirmation Agreements
Section 524(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, unlike the 1898 Act,
substantially restricts the ability of a creditor to obtain reaffirma-
tion of a discharged debt.23 6 First, a reaffirmation agreement must
be entered into prior to the granting of a discharge and a debtor
has the absolute right to rescind the agreement for thirty days af-
ter it becomes enforceable. Second, individual debtors are required
to personally attend a discharge hearing where the judge must in-
form the debtor of his right to discharge, the nature and effect of
the agreement, and the consequences of default under the agree-
ment. 3 7 Since the agreement does not become enforceable until
approved by the court, an individual debtor will have thirty days
from the date of the discharge hearing within which to rescind. Fi-
nally, in the case of individual consumer debts not secured by real
property, the court cannot approve the agreement unless it finds
either 1) that reaffirmation will not impose undue hardship on the
debtor or his dependents and is in the best interest of the debtor
or his dependents or 2) that it was entered in good faith and either
as part of settlement of litigation concerning the dischargeability
of a debt under section 523 or as consideration for the debtor's
redeeming personal property from a creditor under section 722.' 8
5. Effect of a Discharge
Section 524 of the Code seeks comprehensively to assure that
234. Id.
235. Id. § 523(c).
236. Id. § 524(c).
237. Id. § 524(d).
238. Id. § 524(c)(4).
[Vol. 3:13
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
a debtor enjoys complete relief from discharged debts and will not
be pressured in any way to repay them. 39 It effectively prohibits
all forms of creditor collection activity. Subsection (a) voids any
judgment, retroactively and prospectively, which is a determina-
tion of personal liability of a debtor on a discharged debt and en-
joins any act by a creditor to collect a discharged debt either from
the debtor or his property. This last prohibition is broad enough to
bar employment of any type of legal process as well as such infor-
mal collection methods as phone calls, personal contact, employer
contact, or dun letters. In accordance with the general Code policy
disfavoring reaffirmation, the above injunctive effect of a discharge
exists regardless of whether or not a debtor has waived dis-
charge.240 Such waivers have no legal effect. Finally, section 525
further guarantees the debtor's fresh start by broadly prohibiting a
state or local governmental unit from discriminating against a per-
son because he has been a debtor under the Code, has not paid a
discharge debt, or was insolvent before, during, or after a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. 41
Conclusion
The preceding discussion is by no means an exhaustive treat-
ment of the new Bankruptcy Code. It is intended more as a
roadmap to guide the general practitioner in coping with the
trauma of suddenly being forced to lay down a familiar legal fabric
and take up another that is not so well-known. There is, of course,
no substitute for a thorough reading and analysis of statutory lan-
guage and legislative history when faced with the problems of a
flesh-and-blood client. This is even more important with a complex
and comprehensive new statute: there are no court decisions to of-
fer guidance. Hopefully, this article will have supplied the back-
ground and overview to make that analysis a little easier.
239. Id. § 524.
240. Id. § 524(a).
241. Id. § 525.
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